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Many fanners in depressed sectors of the U.S. agricultural economy are seeking 
alternatives to traditional enterprises and production practices. Researchers and political 
leaders are combining forces to explore and promote new farming opportunities. A 1987 
regional conference on farming alternatives in the south featured discussions of fanners' 
experiences with such diverse options as blueberries, catfish, quail, rabbits, muscadines 
and shiitake mushrooms (Southern Rural Development Center). The most popular 
farming alternatives identified in a recent survey of 14 southern states were fruit and 
vegetable enterprises (Estes). 
The search for new crops coincides with increased consumer preferences for fresh 
fruits and vegetables due to nontraditional demand determinants such as concern for 
health and nutrition (Capps). Per capita U.S. consumption of fresh fruits and vegetables, 
excluding melons and citrus, rose from 193.3 to 209.3 pounds from 1970 to 1981 (U.S. 
Department of Agriculture). Even if changes in consumer preferences were not 
I 
considered, demand for fresh produce should increase due to anticipated changes in the 
composition of the population, according to a 1986 study in which food demal\tls were 
projected (Blaylock and Smallwood). Assuming the historical income ·growth rate of 2%, 
mOderate population growth, and age, regional and racial demographic changes, the study 
estimated that U.S. demand for fresh vegetables would increase 18 percent by 1990 and 
1 
36 percent by the year 2000 over 1980 consumption levels (Figure 1). 
Although vegetable production has traditionally been dominated by western states, 
the last decade has seen significant increases in the production of vegetables such as 
broccoli and tomatoes in other regions (Love). From 1978 to 1982, the percentage of 
fresh broccoli produced in the west dropped from 95 to 88 percent. Texas annual 
production of fresh broccoli and cauliflower has grown 38 and 23 percent, respectively. 
In Florida, production of tomatos and lettuce for the fresh market has increased at an 
average annual rate of 8 percent. 
The shifts in production regions can be attributed to both changes in comparative 
advantage and fondness for local produce. Evidence from Tennessee suggests that 
consumers prefer particular produce grown locally over out-of-state produce when 
available (Eastwood, Orr and Brooker). The Tennessee study found that 36 percent of 
the consumers interviewed were willing to pay higher prices to obtain locally grown 
tomatoes, but not apples and cabbage. 
Interest in fresh fruit and vegetable production is particularly high in southern U.S. 
states not only because of changes in consumer demands and pressure to find alternatives 
to traditional field crops but also because the climate and soils are generally suitable for 
horticultural production. In Oklahoma, agronomic and climatological factors as well as 
market windows have been studied to determine whether Southeastern Oklahoma has the 
potential to become a commercial fresh produce production region (Sieper, et al.). A 
feasibility study that examined consumption trends concluded that fresh vegetable 
production and marketing is a better alternative than production for canning or processing 
for improving the incomes of small (limited resource) farmers in Southeastern Oklahoma 
(Tilley, et al., 1984). 
Southeastern Oklahoma Project Background 
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public trust by the State of Oklahoma to conduct a preliminary resource analysis and 
oversee the development of a comprehensive multi-purpose regional natural resource 
program. Agriculture is one of the major sectors addressed by the program. 
In pursuance of its primary agricultural objective, which is to develop a fruit and 
vegetable industry in the area, RedArk opened in 1985 the Three Rivers Produce 
Company, a fresh produce packing facility (RedArk Development Authority). Once 
Three Rivers is able to pack a sufficient volume of produce to operate profitably, it will 
be sold or leased by RedArk to private operators or to a cooperative of vegetable growers 
(Dayvault, et al.). 
Three Rivers faces several obstacles to reaching a profitable level of operation and 
making a smooth transition from being a subsidized development project to a privately or 
cooperatively run facility. Projected production levels for 1987 were not achieved due to 
weather and market conditions, setting back the 1989 goal for profitable operation 
(Sears). The variability in prices and yields has contributed to Three Rivers' inability to 
establish a fixed timetable for reaching self-sufficiency. The project has also had 
problems motivating growers to increase acreage levels. Grower reluctance to expand 
production could be due to the perceived market and production risks involved. 
As the next chapter outlines, there are relatively few methods available to fresh 
produce growers to shift or reduce price or yield risk to other marketing channel 
participants or to speculators. The impact that the packing facility can have on the 
riskiness of the returns to the producers is particularly critical in light of the limited risk 
management options available to fresh produce growers. It is the hypothesis of this thesis 
that the packing facility can affect the riskiness of the returns to producers through 
selection of the policies which govern how revenues are distributed and costs are 
allocated. These policies need to be examined because inequitable policies could 
discourage growers or inadvertantly favor production of particular crops. 
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Objectives of the Study 
The general objective of this study is to analyze the impacts on returns to producers 
of alternative revenue distribution and cost allocation rules of a multi-product fresh 
produce packing facility operated as a cooperative. Analysis of these rules is conducted 
under conditions of uncertain yields and prices. 
To satisfy these objectives a simulation model is developed. The simulation uses 
Three Rivers packing facility data as a case study to provide an empirical exercise with a 
realistic framework. Specifically, the objectives are to: 
1. Measure the impact of different combinations of cost allocation and revenue 
distribution policies under stochastic yield and price conditions on producer returns to 
fixed resources for Three Rivers producers. 
2. Specify the risk efficient set of policies for the different classes of Three Rivers 
producers using a mean-variance criterion (EV). Farmer classess are based on the crop 
mix planted. 
3. Analyze grower preferences for specific policies for different levels of risk aversion 
using stochastic dominance with respect to a function analysis (SDRF). 
4. Compare the results from the EV and SDRF approaches. 
5. Formulate managerial recommendations for Three Rivers based on the results of the 
study. 
Characteristics of the Study Area 
The RedArk project area consists of 24 counties bordered by the Arkansas River on 
the north and the Red River on the south. Three Rivers Produce is located in Atoka 
County. Slightly less than one-half of the growers who market their produce at Three 
Rivers reside in Bryan and Atoka counties (Figure 2). 
Growing conditions, major crops, soils, and socioeconomic characteristics vary 
5 
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widely over the 24-county region. The characteristics of the study region will be confined 
to Atoka, Bryan, Carter, Coal, Garvin, Johnston, Love, Marshall, Murray, and Pontotoc 
Counties where most Three Rivers growers reside. 
Per capita income in the study region in 1982 averaged $8,340, and ranged from a 
low of $5,371 in Atoka County to a high of $11,083 in Carter County, which are 48% and 
98% of statewide levels, respectively (Center for Economic and Management Research). 
Population density is low, averaging 31 people per square mile, compared to a statewide 
average of 48. Atoka, Coal, and Love Counties have 15 or less people per square mile. 
Seventy-five percent of the land in the study area is devoted to agricultural purposes. 
Statewide agricultural production in 1982 was valued at approximately $3.3 billion. 
With 6.3% of the population and 9.7% of the land, the study region contributed 6.5% of 
the value of agricultural output in 1982. Roughly one-half of the total value of state 
agricultural production in 1986 was from the sale of cattle and calves. As of the 
beginning of 1987, the inventory of cattle in the study region represented 14% of the state 
total. 
Major field crops in the study region are peanuts, hay, com, soybeans, and oats 
(Oklahoma Agricultural Statistics, 1986). Bryan County ranks 7th in the state in oats 
production, 4th in com, and lOth in soybeans. Five of the top ten counties in peanut 
production are located in the study region. Atoka County ranks 5th statewide in hay 
production. 
Average annual precipitation in the south central district is 36.75 inches, slightly 
higher than the annual state average of 33.32 inches. Considering the climatic and 
agronomic factors of Atoka County, it has been estimated that vegetables can be 
successfully grown there for a period of eight to nine months (Sieper, et al.). Average 
annual rainfall is sufficient for vegetable production, but due to irregular rainfall patterns 
in the summer, irrigation is necessary for successful vegetable production. Soils suitable 
for vegetable production are the sandy loam soils with less than 5% slope and good 
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drainage. In Atoka County alone, an estimated 95,000 acres, or 15% of the county, are 
suitable for vegetable production (Sieper, et al). 
Organization of Study 
In the following chapter, the theoretical background for the study is provided as is an 
overview of the relevant literature. Chapter II has three major focuses: (1) the concept of 
risk in agriculture, with particular emphasis on risk in fresh produce production, (2) the 
tools used to analyze decisions under risk, and (3) an overview of studies focusing on 
cost allocation and revenue distribution rules in the cooperative management literature. 
Chapter ill explains the fixed cost and packing allocation rules used and provides an 
overview of the simulation model constructed and employed in the analysis. Chapter N 
provides the results of the simulation modeling and stochastic dominance analysis. 
Chapter V summarizes the results, discusses managerial recommendations for the 
packing facility, and suggests areas for further research. 
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CHAPTER II 
THEORETICAL BACKGROUND AND LITERATURE REVIEW 
The purpose of this chapter is to review the literature relevant to decisionmaking 
under risk in order to establish the basis for the analysis that follows. The review 
includes basic risk concepts, risk management strategies, criteria for selecting the risk 
efficient alternative among several choices, and packing facility management strategies 
that influence the risk of fresh produce enterprises. 
The first section provides an overview of the risk concepts in agricultural economic 
analysis as well as the sources of risk. Responses available to agricultural producers to 
mitigate the adverse impacts of risk are examined. Discussion of risk sources and 
responses is made with special emphasis on the production and marketing environment of 
fresh vegetable growers in a new production region. The second section of this chapter 
reviews optimization and simulation, the two primary approaches to analysis of risk 
strategies in agriculture. In addition, the use of stochastic dominance criteria to order 
risky alternatives is covered in the second section. 
The third and final section reviews the literature concerning cooperative 
management and decisionmaking, and focuses on empirical studies which have examined 
operating strategies such as the ones considered in this analysis. The final section is 
relevant because the-cooperative form of organization is a feasible alternative for 
Three Rivers growers to pursue when RedArk relinquishes control of the packing facility. 
In addition, the bulk of the literature concerning packing facility management occurs 
within the context of cooperatively owned facilities. 
9 
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Risk in Agriculture 
Basic Concemts of Risk 
The two basic concepts or measures of risk are ( 1) the "chance of loss" or safety first 
concept in which the decision maker's goals give highest priority to avoiding some 
"disaster" level of income before profit maximization is considered and (2) measures of 
variation from expected values. In Figure 3, the concept of chance of loss is compared to 
the mean-variance measure of risk. The probability that profits will fall below the 
disaster level of income is greater for distribution 1 than for distribution 2 in both figures 
3a and 3b so distribution 1 is considered riskier than distribution 2 in both figures under 
the chance of loss concept. In Figure 3a distribution 2 has a higher variance and is 
considered riskier than distribution 1 under the mean-variance concept of risk. 
Distributions 1 and 2 in Figure 3b cannot l?e ordered because both have equal means and 
variances. Both chance of loss and mean-variance concepts have been used extensively 
in agricultural applications (Young). 
Three different safety-first rules (Telser; Kataoka; Roy) are described in Robison, et 
al. (1984) and Hazel and Norton. Since safety-first rules involve sequential ordering of 
goals, they are referred to as lexicographic ordering. Research involving multiple goals in 
firm level studies includes efforts to determine the impact of multiple goals and 
alternative specifications of multiple goal objective functions on optimal production 
patterns and farm growth and survival (Dobbins and Mapp; Harmon; Hatch; Candler and 
Boehlje). 
The second and more widely used concept of risk uses some measure of variation 
from expected values such as the mean-variance (EV) model (Markowitz) or the mean-
absolute deviation (EA) model (Hazell). The EA model measures risk in terms of total 
absolute deviations from the expected level of income or returns and is a modification of 
the EV model which dates back to Markowitz's work in the 1950s on portfolio 
11 
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diversification. Markowitz showed how investors can reduce investment risk by 
choosing stocks which do not move together, or have lower correlation coefficients. 
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The EV model is consistent with the expected utility model which has been the 
major paradigm of the theory of decision making since World War II (Shoemaker). The 
expected utility model (EUM) infers that decision makers who obey the axioms of 
ordering, transitivity, choice substitution and certainty equivalents (von Neumann and 
Morgenstern) will select alternatives that maximize their utility. The concept of expected 
utility developed from the 18th century work of Daniel Bernoulli who observed people in 
gambling situations unwilling to pay much to play a game of chance with infinite 
expected monetary outcomes, the "Petersburg paradox" (Shoemaker). Bernoulli 
considered that people maximize utility rather than monetary outcomes. 
Only when decision makers are risk neutral does maximization of utility and 
monetary outcomes produce the same results. Risk averse decision makers have 
diminishing marginal utility for successive increases in income (Robison and Barry). 
Graphically, the risk attitudes of the risk averse (neutral) decision makers are represented 
by concave (linear) utility functions. In Figure 4a the linear utility function of a risk 
neutral decision maker is illustrated. The expected utility of the outcome (EU(X)) is 
equivalent to the expected monetary or mean outcome. 
Figure 4b shows the concave utility function of the risk averse decision maker. The 
expected utility of the outcome (EU(X)) is equal to the utility of the certainty equivalent 
(CE). The certainty equivalent (CE) is the outcome which is certain and is preferred to 
the uncertain expected value of the outcome variable. This is true because decreases in 
utility due to monetary losses exceed utility gains which are of the same magnitude and 
and have the same probability of occurring. The difference between the certainty 
equivalent and expected monetary outcome is the risk premium, what the decision maker 
would have to be compensated in order to take the risky alternative. 
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variance of returns for a given level of mean returns. Risk neutral decision makers 
maximize returns regardless of their variance. 
Sources of Risk 
Firms face both fmancial and business risks. Financial risks are associated with 
increased leverage or debt to equity ratios as firms finance investments with borrowed 
capital. As leverage increases, the need for cash to service the debt increases and credit 
reserves decrease. When both cash and credit reserves are reduced, a firm's ability to 
respond to unexpected and adverse events is diminished. When economic conditions 
deteriorate for prolonged periods, a decline in the valuation of the firm's assets may 
occur, which may lead to an erosion of the firm's debt to equity position. Restrained 
borrowing capacity and insolvency are often the results. 
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Five sources of business risk have been identified: production, marketing, 
technology, legal and social issues, and human sources (Sonka and Patrick). The 
business risks that affect producers of fresh vegetables can be translated into uncertainty 
at the packing facility level. The major sources of production and marketing risk are 
examined in the context of the relationship between the fresh produce grower and packer. 
Production Risk. Production risk, normally measured in terms of yield variability, is 
th~ result of uncontrollable factors such as weather, insect infestations, or natural 
disasters. In the case of a new fresh fruit and vegetable production region, yield 
variability at the farm level can also be affected by growers' relative inexperience with 
varieties and cultural practices. Such yield uncertainty is translated into a source of risk 
at the packing level (Tilley, Falk, and Schatzer). Lower yields lead to higher per unit 
packing costs because fixed packing costs are distributed over a smaller volume. In 
addition, decreases in the quality of fresh produce received at the packing facility have an 
even mo~e significant effect on per unit packing costs than do equivalent levels of yield 
15 
variation due to the labor costs incurred when unmarketable crops must be handled at the 
packing facility. 
Variations in yield and quality thus affect both directly and indirectly the returns to 
farmers. Lower yields and quality mean less product to market and lower prices 
received, a direct effect. But lower yields and quality also increase packing costs and 
hence also adversely affect farmer profits. 
Marketin~: Risk. Marketing risk can occur due to volatility in input prices, 
availability of inputs, or swings in output prices. In the case of fresh produce, variable 
production costs are higher than for traditional field crops and in new production regions 
local lenders may be reluctant to lend money for such projects. Variable per acre 
production costs for the crops analyzed in this study and traditional field crops grown in 
Southeastern Oklahoma are shown in Table I. 
Fluctuations in input prices may cause cash flow problems for the limited resource 
farmer. Variability in interest and inflation rates, and uncertainty over labor supplies 
during the labor intensive periods such as planting and harvesting also contribute to 
marketing risk. In addition, supply and demand relationships are sensitive:~~ble \) 
prices can change dramatically in a given market due to one extra truckload of produce \ 
(Runyan, et al.). 
Although the packing facility can insulate itself from price risk in the short term by 
covering its costs before paying the producer, the continued viability of the packing 
facility depends on the packer passing on high enough prices such that the producer earns 
a profit and has an inc~ntive to continue growing. The packing facility may assume the 
price risk by paying a predetermined price to the growers in order to stimulate production 
and consequently reduce unit packing costs through increased volume. This strategy 
could stimulate production, but increase the chances that the packing facility becomes 
insolvent due to exposure to price risk. 
TABLE I 
PER ACRE VARIABLE COSTS OF PRODUCTION 
FOR FRESH PRODUCE AND TRADITIONAL 
FIELD CROPS IN SOUTHEASTERN 
OKLAHOMA 
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In the context of operating a packing facility as a marketing cooperative, regardless 
who initially assumes the price risk, the producers and the packer as a system are subject 
to price risk. Unlike other commodity sectors such as grains and livestock, the fresh 
produce industry has relatively limited alternatives to reduce risk or mitigate the effects 
of risk, particularly price risk. 
Res.ponses to Risk 
Production responses to risk generally involve diversification through enterprise 
selection or geographic dispersion, substitution of capital inputs for labor, and technical 
production practices. Marketing responses to risk include hedging on the futures market, 
forward contracting, storage, sales spreading and government program participation. 
Financial responses to risk include methods to maintain liquidity positions such as asset 
leasing, share rental and insurance (Sonka and Patrick). Fresh vegetable producers do not 
have available the range of risk management tools that field crop and livestock producers 
can employ to minimize or transfer risk. The tools that do exist can be grouped 
according to the production, marketing and financial aspects of business organization 
(Boehlje and Trede). 
Production responses to risk generally involve diversification through enterprise 
selection or geographic dispersion, substitution of capital inputs for labor, and technical 
production practices. Marketing responses to risk include hedging on the futures market, 
forward contracting, storage, sales spreading and government program participation. 
Financial responses to risk include methods to maintain liquidity positions such as asset 
leasing, share rental and insurance (Sonka and Patrick). 
The processing or packing facility can also affect the riskiness of crop production. 
Guaranteed prices reduce risk to the producers but increase it for the packing facility. The 
first handler can also contract to buy the crop as long as prescribed cultural practices are 
followed and crop failures are due solely to uncontrollable weather patterns. The latter 
18 
strategies are used in the vegetable processing industry. Packing or processing facilities 
can reduce yield variability by employing field technicians to provide technical 
assistance. In addition, within the context of a cooperatively managed packing or 
processing facility in which revenues are pooled, the selection of these pooling rules can 
affect the distribution of returns to producers (Buccola and Subaei). 
The following discussion identifies production and marketing risk response 
alternatives which are available to the grower engaged in fresh produce production. 
Production Responses to Risk. In the case of fresh vegetables, viable production 
responses to risk include enterprise diversification, although selection is limited to the 
crop varieties that local climate, soils and conditions permit and market analysis 
determines feasible. For example, sweet corn has the potential to be a profitable 
alternative in southeastern Oklahoma if infestation by the corn ear worm can be brought 
under control. Until such time this alternative is excluded from the ''vegetable portfolio". 
Moreover, the risk reduction gains possible through diversification are limited by the 
total number of enterprises, covariation of returns between enterprises, and economies of 
scale gained through specialization. Portfolio theory has been used to explain the 
limitations imposed by number of enterprises and covariances or correlations between 
enterprises. Risk reduction through diversification is negligible beyond a specific 
number of investments. The existence of high positive covariances of returns for 
investments or crops planted also translates into minimal gains from diversification. 
Perhaps the greatest obstacle that commercial farms face in using diversification as a 
risk management tool is the economies of scale achievable from large scale production of 
fewer crops. Diversification is most effective when economies of scale in production 
are not available. The trade-off between specialization and diversification also applies to 
packing facilities. Within the context of small farms in a new production region, product 
line and seasonal diversification would seem the most appropriate risk management tools 
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for the packing facility, given that production levels are low and crop mixes are 
fluctuating. In Oklahoma, seasonal diversification means planting crops such as broccoli, 
cabbage, and cauliflower in both spring and fall. 
Because vegetable production requires the use of specialized planting and harvesting 
equipment, investment in such assets can increase fmancial risk. Recognizing the capital 
investment needed to produce and harvest vegetables, RedArk has provided Three Rivers 
with equipment that first- time producers can use until they determine whether they are 
willing to commit more resources to vegetable production. 
Wide geographic dispersion is usually not an alternative available to small scale 
vegetable farmers due to the highly management intensive nature of vegetable 
production. In many cases, labor cannot be replaced with equipment because no suitable 
mechanical means exist to transplant or harvest. Sometimes the machinery available is 
not used, as in the case of fresh market tomatoes which are harvested by hand to prevent 
bruising. In addition, the small size of fresh vegetable operations may not justify the 
investment in expensive specialized equipment. 
One production risk response that vegetable producers can use is to employ cultural 
practices that reduce yield variability. In the case of Three Rivers a field manager is 
employed to establish production management guidelines and help growers follow them 
to achieve maximum yields and quality. Southeastern Oklahoma growers can also take 
advantage of the research on applicable cultural practices and recommended varieties 
conducted at the Wes Watkins Agricultural Research and Extension Center in Atoka 
County. 
Examples of production practices which have been adopted to reduce risk in the 
Florida tomato industry include laser leveling of fields to provide greater uniformity of 
soil moisture which reduces yield variability, and the use of sprinkler systems to mitigate 
frost damage. In addition, Florida tomato growers plant on raised beds covered in plastic 
which provides greater temperature and humidity uniformity in the root zone (Buckley, et 
al.). Florida's main competitor in the production of tomatoes for the winter market, 
Mexico, employs none of these methods. 
Marketin~ Responses to Risk. Marketing responses to risk in vegetable production 
for the fresh market are also limited. Futures markets do not exist for fresh produce. 
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However, both vertical coordination and integration exist in fresh produce marketing as a 
response to the difficulties involved in organizing production and packing. 
Vertical integration is defined as the participation by one business organization in 
more than one step in the production and marketing system through ownership (Black 
and Haskell). Vertical coordination involves a contractual relationship between 
producers and a processor or packer in which the delivery of a commodity at a future date 
and pricing method is specified in writing. Forward contracts are involved in more than 
50 percent of the produce grown for processors, and between 10 and 50 percent of the 
produce grown for the fresh market (Sporleder and Holder). 
Since vertical coordination involves setting prices in advance of delivery of the 
product, the packing/processing facility who contracts with producers assumes the price 
risk. Nevertheless, first handlers are usually the ones who initiate these contracts since 
most of the benefits accrue to them (Sporleder and Holder). These benefits include being 
able to plan with some degree of certainty the quality, quantity and timing of delivery. 
Because they are guaranteed a fixed price, producers may improve their chances for 
obtaining financing when they forward contract. However, in exchange for price security 
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farmers relinquish some freedom of decision making. 
Since most fresh vegetables must be sold and consumed soon after harvest (cabbage 
and potatoes are exceptions), long term storage is generally not available as a risk 
management tool. Production and harvest periods are constrained by climatic factors in 
Oklahoma, limiting sales spreading as a diversification method to reduce variability of 
returns over time. 
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Government programs do not exist for fresh produce, except for market orders. 
Market orders are mandatory programs established with the consent of producers of 
particular commodities in specific geographic locations. They are requested by producers 
for such purposes as regulating quality and packing materials, limiting quantities 
marketed, and generating revenues for generic commodity advertising (Polopolus, et al.). 
Analysis of Risk Management Strategies 
Two basic approaches, optimization and simulation, are used to analyze decision 
making under risk, although simulation models with optimization algorithms can be 
considered a third technique (Baum and Richardson). Optimization uses some form of 
risk programming model. Simulation is "numerical manipulation of a symbolic model of 
a system over time" (Anderson). Both optimization and simulation can analyze 
stochastic (random) variables and dynamic (multi-period) scenarios. The primary 
difference between optimization and simulation is that the former produces optimal or 
risk efficient crop mixes and risk management strategies, while the latter predicts the 
outcome of a given set of decisions and circumstances. Thus, programming models are 
normative in nature, while simulation, when optimization is not involved, is a positive 
approach. 
Optimization 
Techniques for optimization under risk include quadratic programming (QP) which 
uses the mean-variance (EV) efficiency criterion, MOT AD model which uses total 
absolute deviations (EA) as a measure of risk, and the Target MOT AD approach (Tauer) 
which uses a safety-first definition of risk. The QP model requires a non-linear 
programming algorithm, while MOT AD and Target MOT AD models can be run with 
linear programming packages. (See Mapp and Helmers; Hazell and Norton; Baum and 
Schertz for discussions of recent studies of farm level optimization models). 
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The first application of QP in agriculture was in a study by Freund. Since then, 
numerous applications of the mean-variance model in whole farm planning have been 
made, although disagreement exists over the most appropriate method of estimating the 
parameters (the mean and variance) of probability distributions in EV studies (Young). 
Moreover, QP has been criticized for its restrictive assumptions: either the returns must 
be normally distributed or the utility function of the decision maker must be quadratic to 
ensure that only the first two moments of the distribution are relevant. Empirical studies 
have demonstrated the significance of higher order moments such as skewness in 
distribution of crop yields (Day) and in net returns considering participation in 
government programs (Kramer and Pope). Quadratic utility functions imply increasing 
risk aversion with increases in wealth, which has little theoretical or empirical support 
(Kramer and Pope; Pratt). Optimization studies which incorporate various production, 
marketing or financial risk management strategies have been conducted (Mapp, et al.; 
Johnson and Boehlje ). Programming has also been used in comparisons of the use of 
forward contracts with hedging on the futures market or other marketing and production 
strategies (Bolen, et al.; Klinefelter; and Shurley). In a review of these latter 
programming studies, Sonka and Patrick found that routine hedging and forward 
contracting may not greatly reduce price risk. Other programming studies analyzing the 
relative importance of forward contracting and futures trading have reached different 
conclusions (Nelson; Miller). A multi- period quadratic programming study which 
investigated the interaction between credit and level of forward contracting for cotton and 
sorghum producers found that contracting influences income stability and growth, and 
credit availability (Barry and Willmann). 
Simulation 
Simulation has several advantages (Law and Kelton) that make it preferable to 
optimization. These advanges include the ability to estimate the performance of an 
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existing system under a variety of operating conditions. Simulation models can easily 
account for stochastic variables, multiple time periods, and complex operating 
environments. Simulation models can have the disadvantages of being complex and time-
consuming to develop. The complexity of some models may create unjustified 
confidence in their results (Law and Kelton). However, to achieve the objectives of this 
study, simulation is considered the most appropriate methodology, despite its drawbacks. 
Extensive reviews of the use of simulation analysis in agricultural economics and 
characteristics of the models have been made (Anderson; Johnson and Rausser; Baum 
and Richardson). Anderson reviews both macro and micro level simulation studies 
conducted up through the early 1970s. At the micro level he distinguishes between farm 
planning/frrm growth studies and process level applications which analyze soil-water-
plant systems. Recently, a review of the role of biophysical simulation in production 
economics has been conducted (Musser and Tew). Farm planning/growth studies have 
investigated intergenerational transfer of farm firms (Roush), effects of loan 
arrangements and debt to equity levels (Patrick), and the impacts of government 
commodity programs and income tax policies. A recent summary of the latter type of 
study is found in Richardson and Nixon (1986). 
Current models to analyze farm planning, growth, and/or risk management strategies 
are said to be in the third generation of development (Baum and Richardson). The first 
generation began with the development of the first whole-farm simulation model by 
Halter and Dean. The second generation includes models which added multiple goal 
frameworks and financial statement information as simulation output (Patrick and 
Eisgruber; Hutton and Hinman; Mapp, et al.; Harman; and Hatch). The most recent 
generation of simulation models includes work by Boehlje and Griffin; Hardin; and 
Richardson and Condra. This latter generation allows modeling of a richer set of farm 
level behaviors and constraints such as participation in farm programs, tax laws, and 
family consumption functions. 
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Analysis of Simulation Ounmt. In addition to being a flexible tool for specifications 
of the inputs in a complex environment, simulation has the advantage of flexibility in 
providing a variety of outputs. Sensitivity analysis can be conducted to determine the 
impact of key assumptions of the model on the use of inputs. Simulation results can also 
be output in the form of cumulative distribution functions (CDF) of output variables. The 
CDFs of output variables such as net returns can be analyzed using decision rules that 
identify the alternatives preferred by decision makers with different risk attitudes. These 
decision rules or efficiency criteria are used to classify alternatives into efficient (those 
preferred by decision makers) and inefficient (those not preferred) sets. 
Stochastic dominance criteria have increasingly become the efficiency criteria of 
choice for analysis of simulation output. These criteria enable consideration of alternative 
strategies on the basis of more than just the first two moments of the distributions of 
probable outcomes, overcoming a deficiency of the mean-variance approach described 
previously. Moreover, stochastic dominance has seen increasing use in empirical studies 
because its use does not require specification or knowledge of individual utility functions. 
First and Second Deme Stochastic Dominance. Stochastic dominance criteria can be 
used to select the preferred or undominated strategy from a pair-wise comparison of 
probability distributions using first (FSD) and second (SSD) degree stochastic dominance 
(Hanoch and Levy; Hadar and Russell). First degree stochastic dominance has low 
discriminating power because it only requires that decision makers prefer more to less 
(have positive utility for money). Under SSD, decision makers are assumed to be risk 
averse; their utility functions have positive, non-increasing slopes at all income levels. 
SSD provides greater discriminating power than FSD. When the outcome distributions 
are normally distributed or the decision maker's utility function is quadratic, the SSD 
efficient set is identical to the EV efficient set. 
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Under FSD an alternative defined by the cumulative distribution function (CDF) F(y) 
is preferred to or dominates the alternative with the cumulative distribution function G(y) 
if F(y) :::;; G(y) for all values of y and the inequality is strict for some value (King and 
Robison, 1984). Graphically this means that the CDF F(y) must lie everywhere to the 
right of the CDF G(y) in order to dominate. If the distributions cross, no decision can be 
made under FSD. 
Under SSD, an alternative with the CDF F(y) dominates another with the CDF G(y) if 
F(y)dy :::;; G(y)dy for all values of y and the inequality is strict for some value of y. Thus 
the distributions are compared on the basis of the area under the CDFs. With SSD, CDFs 
that cross can be compared only if they cross at the top. In Figure 5, F(y) dominates G(y) 
under SSD and FSD because F(y) lies everywhere to the right of G(y). Under FSD and 
SSD, H(y) and G(y) cannot be ordered because they cross at the bottom. Under SSD, 
F(y) dominates H(y) because they cross at the top of the distributions. 
Stochastic Dominance With Respect to a Function. Comparison of alternatives using 
stochastic dominance with respect to a function (SDRF) has better discriminating power 
than both FSD and SSD, and does not require the assumption of risk aversion on the part 
of the decision maker as does EV, EA and SSD (Meyer; King and Robison, 1984). SDRF 
is based on expected utility theory. It reduces the set of alternatives to a subset that 
includes strategies with the highest expected utility for decision makers whose Arrow-
Pratt coefficient of absolute risk aversion: 
Ra(y) = -U"(y)/U'(y) 
lies between specified upper and lower bounds: 
r1(y):::;; -U"(y)/U'(y):::;; r2(y) for all values ofy. 
The Arrow-Pratt coefficient is simply the negative of the quotient of the second and 
first derivatives of the utility function. If Ra(y) is positive, the decision maker's attitude 
toward risk can be characterized as averse, while if Ra(y) is negative, it can be concluded 







FSD: F(y) dominates G(y) only 
SSD: F(y) dominates both G(y) and H(y) 
Figure 5. First and Second Degree Stochastic Dominance 




The appropriate upper and lower boundaries of the absolute risk aversion function can 
be estimated using an interval approach developed by King and Robison (1981). Both 
FSD and SSD are special cases of SDRF. The SDRF boundary intervals under FSD 
criteria are r1 (y) = -oo and r2(y) = oo for all values of y since no restrictions are placed on 
the risk aversion function. Under SSD criteria the boundary levels are r1(y) = 0 and r2(y) 
= oo for all values of y since SSD requires that marginal utility be positive and decreasing. 
Recent farm simulation studies have employed stochastic dominance criteria to order 
risky alternatives. Kramer and Pope demonstrated that distributions of net returns for 
representative farms participating in farm programs could not be ranked using EV 
criteria, but could using st~hastic dominance. Following Kramer and Pope's lead, 
Richardson and Nixon (1982) used stochastic dominance criteria to determine preference 
of various risk groups of cotton farmers for a cotton farmer owned reserve under 18 
different farm programs. Pederson used stochastic dominance criteria to evaluate farmer 
preferences for five share/cash rental strategies under risky conditions. 
For soybean producers in Louisiana, Zacharias, et al. found that forward and futures 
price distributions dominate distributions of returns based on cash sales at harvest as 
determined by stochastic dominance criteria. A 1986 study used plant growth simulation 
models to produce yield estimates and stochastic dominance analysis techniques to 
identify optimal marketing strategies of a corn, soybean, peanut, and wheat farm in 
Florida for different levels of risk aversion. The results showed that risk averse farmers 
should prefer some forward contracting while low risk averse or risk loving farmers 
should prefer cash sales at harvest (Anaman and Boggess). 
Stochastic dominance criteria should be applied with caution in the case where the 
alternatives being considered, such as marketing plans or tillage options, are not mutually 
exclusive or less than perfectly correlated (McCarl, et al.). If not mutually exclusive, 
diversification of the alternatives is a possibility. In a review of thirteen studies, the 
outcome distributions in eleven were not derived from mutually exclusive alternatives, 
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although only one of the studies investigated diversification directly. 
McCarl, et al. provide two rules, empirically tested for non-normal distributions, for 
determining when stochastic dominance of one alternative over another implies stochastic 
dominance over all linear combinations of the two. When distributions are normal, EV 
analysis is equivalent to SSD criteria and thus is the preferred method since the mean-
variance criterion explicitly takes diversification into account. The results of the 
empirical tests for non-normal distributions showed that the rules were quite reliable in 
identifying the level of correlation coefficient above which diversification can be ignored. 
The two rules lead to the conclusion that when correlation is perfect, diversification 
can be ignored, and when correlation is zero or negative, diversification is always 
optimal, rules that concur with results obtained previously (McCarl, et al.). 
Theory of Cooperatives and Cooperative Management 
This section introduces the cooperative form of business organization and reviews the . 
cost allocation and revenue distribution decisions that packing facilities can make which 
affect the riskiness of producer returns. The emphasis on the cooperative literature 
reflects the fact that the cooperative is a common form of organization for small fresh 
produce growers such as those in Southeastern Oklahoma to pursue. Moreover, analyses 
of cost allocation and revenue distribution rules in a packing facility are concentrated in 
the cooperative management literature. 
Cooperatives are business organizations that are democratically controlled by the 
member-owners, provide their members with services at cost, and pay limited returns to 
equity capital (Bar, Abrahamsen). The cooperative is obligated to return to its members 
any surplus or net margins that are earned above the costs of operation in proportion to 
the patronage or volume of business transacted with the cooperative. In practice 
cooperatives can pay a prevailing market price for the products they buy from their 
patrons. Given that the cooperative operates efficiently, these prices are actually 
overcharges, and after paying all expenses, the cooperative will have a surplus or net 
savings to distribute to its members or to retain for investment. The rate of refund to 
distribute members' savings is based on the following formula: 
r = net savings I value of all raw products delivered. 
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The net savings are the difference between sales and the cost of acquiring and processing 
the inputs and operating the cooperative facility. Each member receives a patronage 
refund of r times the value of raw products that the member delivers to the facility. 
Another method that cooperatives (and some non-cooperatively organized businesses 
as well) use to allocate revenues is pooling. Member production is organized into similar 
groups of products, and payments are based on member participation in the specified 
pool. This method reduces the need to segregate individual growers' goods and maintain 
individual member accounts for allocation of returns. Pooling also can affect the variance 
of returns for growers (Buccola and Subaei). 
Pooling has been distinguished from patronage refunds of net margins as methods to 
distribute cooperative savings. A survey in the 1960s of 107 regional marketing 
cooperatives revealed that 92 of those cooperatives used a net margins method while the 
remaining used a pooling method (Davidson). Pooling does not separate payments for 
market value and savings, while the net margins method separates payments in two parts: 
a market price for goods delivered to the cooperative and a patronage refund of net 
savings. In computing patronage refunds, cooperatives can base the refunds on total 
business operations or compute return rates for different departments or divisions. 
The theory of cooperatives as business firms was formalized in a landmark paper by 
Heimberger and Hoos (H-H) who used organizational theory to define cooperatives as 
business firms and then assumed surplus maximizing behavior to derive behavioral 
relations and equilibrium positions using marginal analysis. According to Hardie, the 
H-H paper based its approach on the theory of derived demand and factor supply to 
determine what returns members should receive in a marketing cooperative and how well 
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the cooperative performs in the market. The H-H formulations included both short- and 
long-run specifications of an objective function that maximizes surplus of a cooperative 
that markets only one homogeneous product. Returns per unit for the homogeneous 
product are assumed to be equivalent and all the surplus is returned to cooperative 
members. 
Maximum cooperative surplus is defined by the equation: 
S = (PY-ATC)Yo 
and per unit net returns accruing to members is defined by the equation: 
Pm = [(Py- ATC)YJ/M 
where S is cooperative surplus, P m is the per unit m~mber net return, P Y is the price of the 
product marketed, ATCo is the average total cost of production, Yo is the product 
marketed, and M is the quantity used of the member supplied material. The H-H model 
explains the equilibrium position for members and the marketing cooperative as the 
intersection of the net returns (average revenue) function and the supply function. 
Hardie generalized the H-H model to several products and grades of products. He 
introduced the concept of using shadow prices of a linear programming model to allocate 
the cooperative surplus to member growers according to the surplus earned by each 
member's products within a given pool by equating marginal costs to marginal revenues. 
The study does not provide a method by which pooling should be organized but notes 
that a tradeoff exists between the administrative costs of maintaining additional pools and 
the inequities caused by operating fewer pools. 
This equity/cost tradeoff was explored in a study of optimal pools in an avocado 
marketing cooperative (Sosnick). Development of an optimal pooling criterion was based 
on measuring the reduction in costs and increase in inequities due to reducing the number 
of pools from a more complex structure. Inequities arise when pools are general enough 
to include categories of product with very different resale value and processing or 
handling costs. Such pools would act to reduce the incentive of members to deliver the 
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higher value crops. 
Pooling structure was of concern in the avocado study due to the large number of 
pools that could be arranged. With 150 avocado varieties, 10 grades, 11 sizes and 
seasonal categories which can be as short as one day, the number of conceivable pools 
that could be arranged is 120,000, according to the study. Another empirical study 
investigating the impact ofpooling arrangements analyzed the preferences of growers in 
a multi-product fruit and vegetable processing and marketing cooperative for single, 
multiple and group pools (Buccola and Subaei). The study examined two main features 
of pooling rules: structure and valuation method. The structure of a pooling rule refers 
to the diversity of products in a pool and the valuation method is used to determine the 
contribution that each member makes to a given pool. 
Five pooling arrangements for ten classes of almost 200 growers were studied. The 
ten classes were created such that at least three members produced the products in each 
class. The study analyzed a multiple pool system which establishes one pool for each 
different product handled by the facility, single pools in which all products are grouped in 
one pool, and grouped pools in which member products are pooled in either fruit or 
vegetable pools. 
The two valuation methods used were a local market based pricing system and a three-
year moving average of previous net revenues, which is the income received from the 
sale of the processed product less processing costs. Each of these valuation methods was 
used in both the grouped and single pools. Using historical records from a freezing and 
canning cooperative, fifty series of net returns were calculated, one for each of the five 
pooling arrangements and ten classes of members. The series of returns calculated were 
evaluated using stochastic dominance criteria. Cooperative member preferences were 
found to depend on farm enterprise and risk aversion levels. 
Farmer payments and profits under multiple and single pooling rules were calculated 
in this study using the following definitions and equations: 
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Qii ith grower's output of jth product 
cij ith grower's per unit production cost for jth product 
Pi per unit valuation assigned to the jth product by the cooperative 
Ri per unit revenue from jth processed product minus per unit processing costs, including 
fixed costs 
Rii.Qii net revenues from jth product delivered to cooperative 
Multiple pools 
Farmer payment: Qij 
F..m = - [R.(I,.Q .. )] = Q .. R. 
1J I,.Q.. J 1 1J 1J J 
1 1J 
Under multiple pools the i.th farmer is paid a proportion, expressed in terms of physical 
volume, of the net revenues of the jth pool in which he/she participates. The farmer's 
profit then is net revenues less farm production costs. 
Sin~lepool 
Farmer payment: Qlj 
F .. s = [I,.R.(l'.;Q .. ) 
11 I,.P.(I,.Q .. ) 1 1 11 
J J 1 1J 
Under single pools, the ith farmer is paid a proportion of the total cooperative net 
revenues, which is expressed in terms of the ith member's percentage of all members' 
contibutions of all products. Farmer profits are calculated by summing over the J 
products for the ith member and deducting farm production costs. Between the two 
extremes falls the grouped pooling arrangement which subdivides the J products into K 
mutually exclusive subsets and where 1::;; K::;; J. When K = J, the result is multiple 
pooling and when K = 1 the result is single pools. 
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In another empirical study focusing on a sugar cane processing cooperative, three 
payment arrangements were studied in a multi-level programming model (Lopez and 
Spreen). These payment schemes were based on tonnage of raw material delivered to the 
cooperative, amount of sugar extracted from deliveries, and a use value basis in which 
adjustments for cooperative processing and services are made to the value of sugar 
extracted. A bi-level programming model was used in order to capture the bi-level 
decision making structure of a processing cooperative: (1) the cooperative determines a 
payment system and delivery quota system which is "fair" to its members to allocate 
fixed processing capacity and (2) the members react to the cooperative system established 
in the first level through their planting decisions to maximize their net returns. 
The objective function of the model maximizes total member's profits subject to 
payment system, mill capacity, members' quotas, and variety selection. Plant capacity 
was restricted to ensure adequate volume for economic operation while maintaining 
processing below maximum levels. Quotas were necessary for members because sugar 
content increases the longer sugar cane is left to mature, which causes members to favor 
particular periods for delivery to the plant. Member selection of cane varieties depends on 
the payment schedule and quotas established by the cooperative. The study ignored risk 
considerations such as freeze tolerance in modeling variety selection. 
The use value system was found to result in the highest prices, greatest amount of raw 
product and sugar. It induced members to individually bear their share of cooperative 
costs and revenues, follow more efficient harvesting and planting schedules, follow 
distinct patterns of delivery and select a particular variety. 
In the fruit and vegetable pooling study, member preference for pooling arrangements 
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and pricing strategies are analyzed from an ex post position. As such, the strategies have 
an effect on the distribution but not on the creation of cooperative surplus. In contrast, 
the sugar cane study used an ex ante approach which assumes that creation of the 
· cooperative surplus for distribution depends on the pricing strategy implemented. 
In none of these pooling or payment strategy studies is the issue of allocating fixed 
costs adequately explored. In the multi-product pooling study, fixed or shared costs are 
allocated in proportion to the annual sales revenues of the particular pool. The avocado 
study did acknowledge (but assumed away) the need to decide where (to the pools or to. 
individual members) and how to allocate separable and common costs, profits and losses 
from nonmember patronage. Separable costs include such costs as harvesting, infreight, 
outfreight, spoilage, loss in transit and other costs directly related to particular shipments. 
Common costs are the fixed costs of operation such as depreciation, interest, utilities, 
supplies and other overhead. A question regarding the assignment of equipment costs to 
products not handled by that equipment was also posed but left unexamined. 
In the sugar cane study, determination of fixed costs was assumed to be predetermined 
following suggestions made by Zusman in which marginal costs are equated with 
marginal revenues. However, since the members of the sugar cane cooperative deliver a 
relatively homogeneous product which is processed into one output, allocation of fixed 
costs among members does not pose the same equity difficulties as in a multi-input and 
multi-output cooperative. 
Without providing empirical results, Zusman concludes that the cost allocation method 
is the key determinant influencing the level of output produced by each member. 
Assuming that cost allocation methods are selected through majority voting, he 
investigated how the group choice process in a marketing cooperative affects the decision 
to allocate short run costs of operation among the members to derive the implications for 
the allocative efficiency of the organization and distribution of income among its 
members. Zusman found that when the distribution of member growers is asymmetric 
with respect to the quantity of products marketed through the facility, cost allocation 
conflicts will arise and the majority will exploit the minority to the extent that outside 
competition exists. 
This study extends the work by Zusman because it takes up the issue of the impact of 
cost allocation schemes within the context of a specific empirical example. In addition, 
this study also builds on the optimal pooling analysis done by Buccola and Subaei who 
allocate costs on the basis of contribution to pooled sales revenues and ignore other 
possible cost allocation schemes. 
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CHAPTER III 
PROCEDURES AND DATA 
Simulation Model 
As noted in the previous chapter, there are relatively few ways in which 
producers who grow fruits and vegetables for the fresh market can shift price or yield risk 
to other marketing channel participants or to speculators like producers are able to do in 
the cattle and grain industry. Fresh market producers usually do not even receive any 
kind of price guarantees from the first handling facility who markets the produce as is 
common in the processing industry. For this reason any changes in the riskiness of pro-
ducer returns which results from decisions made by the packing facility are critical. 
Moreover, the importance of investigating decisions which impact the riskiness of pro-
ducer returns is of particular concern in a project such as the one in Southeastern Okla-
homa where stimulation of a new production region is a policy goal. 
In this study, the impacts on producer profits of various cost allocation and reve-
nue distribution rules in a multi-product fresh produce packing facility are modelled to 
determine whether such rules can significantly impact the riskiness of particular crop 
mixes being grown. In addition, the effect of crop mix diversification on the sensitivity 
of producer returns to different cost allocation and revenue distribution rules is analyzed. 
The impacts of different combinations of rules are simulated under conditions of stochas-
tic yields and stochastic weekly prices to model as closely as possible the risk environ-
ment that fresh market producers actually experience. The results of the simulation are 
analyzed using EV analysis and SDRF. 
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Four cost allocation methods and three revenue distribution rules are simulated. 
Costs are allocated on a per crate, tonnage, hours of operation and sales revenues basis. 
The revenue distribution methods are seasonal pooling, crop pooling and no pooling. 
The contribution to sales revenue basis of cost allocation is not combined with the no-
pooling revenue distribution method, making eleven scenarios simulated. The eleven 
scenarios are presented in Table II. 
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The two main activities of the program, cost allocation and revenue distribution 
impacts on producer returns, are discussed in this chapter. The results of the simulation, 
and the mean-variance and stochastic dominance analysis are provided in Chapter 4. A 
flow chart of the computer program is presented in Appendix A. 
Cost Allocation 
Shared or fixed costs are allocated on a per crate, tonnage of packed crates, percent-
age of sales volume, or hours of operation basis. Per unit fixed costs under each of these 
rules are recalculated each iteration since these costs vary as yields change. Fixed or 
shared costs include administrative salaries, utilities, office supplies, fixed asset mainte-
nance and depreciation, and other overhead expenses. Utilities and machinery mainte-
nance aie assumed to grow 10 percent, and office expenses five percent for every 100 
acres planted above 500. 
Packing equipment is separated into standard and specialty lines. Standard packing 
equipment consists of those pieces such as forklifts that every crop uses. Specialty equip-
ment is used only by a subset of crops, such as the waxer used for tomatoes and cucum-
bers, and the buncher used for broccoli. Specialty machinery costs are allocated among 
only those crops using the machines, but on the same cost allocation basis as the other 
fixed costs, whether it is per crate, tonnage or hours of operation. Standard line costs are 
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STANDARD AND SPECIALTY ASSETS 
Asset Initial Salvage Life Crops Assigned 
Value Value 
----------dollars-------- years 
Building 312,670 0 30 all crops 
Truck 6,000 1,000 5 all crops 
Equipment 3,350 0 10 all crops 
Van 6,000 1,000 5 all crops 
Vehicle 8,000 1,000 3 all crops 
Storage 4,000 0 10 all crops 
Waxer 2,000 0 10 CUC, TOM, TUR 
Ice Machine 40,000 0 20 SPB, FB, CAN 
Washer 500 0 10 SPB,FB,CUC 
Sizer 1,590 0 10 TOM, TUR 
Washer/ Absorber 2,500 0 10 CUC, CAN, TUR 
Eliminator 795 0 10 TOM 
Buncher 2,000 0 10 FB, SPB 
Trimmer 2,000 0 10 FB, SPB 
*SPB: Spring Broccoli 






FC: Fall Cabbage 
FB: Fall Broccoli 
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Under a per crate system of allocating costs, shared costs are divided equally be-
tween the total number of crates packed, regardless of crate weight. The tonnage method 
assigns shared costs to each crop based on the percentage of tons each crop represents of 
the total tonnage handled by the packing facility. The third method allocates shared costs 
based on the percentage of hours of packing line operation that each crop requires of total 
packing machinery time. 
The fourth cost allocation method assigns costs based on the value of packing sales 
revenue in each pool after packing revenues have been generated and pooled. In this 
method, costs are allocated to a revenue pool as a percentage of the pool's contribution to 
total annual sales revenue of the packing facility. This cost allocation procedure is used 
by Buccola and Subaei and is described more fully below in the revenue distribution 
section. 
Stochastic yields are generated once each iteration of the program. Because no 
historical yield data exists for horticultural crops in Oklahoma, simulation of crop yields 
is conducted using triangular distributions for each crop. Estimates of each crop's maxi-
mum, minimum and modal yield values were obtained from the executive director of 
Red.Ark Development Au*ority and reviewed by horticultural extension specialists at 
I 
Oklahoma State University. The crop mix, yield assumptions, and acres planted are 
summarized in Table N. The harvest schedule is shown in Table V. Because the esti-
mated production volume from Southeastern Oklahoma represents a small percentage of 
the volume sold in the Dallas market, yields were assumed to be uncorrelated with prices. 
Yields between crops were also assumed to be independent. 
Variable packing costs include direct packing materials, such as crates and bands, 
and direct packing labor. Packing labor is categorized as either labor which handles both 
packed and rejected crates, packed crates only, or rejected crates only. Costs of handling 
rejected crates are added to the costs of handling packed crates. The percentage of crates 





























- - - - - Crates per Acre- - - - - - Pounds 
720 200 350 22 
950 300 400 50 
700 200 330 55 
1500 400 820 25 
632 210 350 40 
1000 300 600 15 
1000 400 700 25 
980 300 500 50 




HARVEST SCHEDULE: PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL 
CROP HARVESTED EACH WEEK 





- - - - - - - ., - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Percentage - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
20 25 9 
21 50 10 
22 25 20 
23 2 7 30 
24 3 7 31 
25 3 7 8 
26 3 11 
27 6 11 
28 6 11 9 8 
29 7 11 9 8 
30 7 11 9 8 
31 7 6 8 8 
32 7 6 8 8 
33 7 6 8 8 
34 7 6 8 8 
35 7 8 9 
36 7 11 9 
37 7 11 9 
38 7 11 9 10 
39 7 10 
40 4 20 
41 4 20 
42 4 20 
43 4 10 
44 20 17 10 
45 20 17 
46 20 17 
47 20 17 
48 10 16 
49 10 
100 100 100 100 1000 100 100 100 100 
1 
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Generation of Prices 
After all costs are calculated and allocated for all iterations, the main program calls 
the subroutine (SEASPR) which generates weekly prices for each crop. Stochastic prices 
are generated to represent weekly prices paid to the packing facility. The weekly pro-
ducer prices are estimated to model the system that Three Rivers packing facility uses to 
pay its producers, which is to quote a price to the producers before knowing the exact 
price the facility will receive. To model this system, a random deviation from the weekly 
packing facility prices of a negative or positive 10 percent is generated and multiplied by 
the simulated producer price. It is assumed that the facility does not commit errors in 
excess of 10 percent when quoting a price to pay the producer. Producer prices also 
serve as measures of the value of the produce brought to the facility which are needed for 
calculation of revenue pools. 
Weekly price simulations are based on weekly Dallas wholesale prices for the ten-
, 
year period 1977 to 1986. A variance-CO"'_ariance matrix.of-thewee.kly-ptic;es was 
--------~- --------------- ·--.. __ 
calculated for the number of weeks in the harvest schedule of each of the nine crops. --------------- ··---------------- . ___________ .. ----------·-· ..... 
These matrices were factored into upper triangle matrices using the method described by 
Clements, Mapp and Eidman in a separate program based on code developed by Spence. 
The variance-covariance matri9es are presented in Appendix B and the factored upper tri-
angle matrices are presented in Appendix C. 
The upper triangle matrices were multiplied by vectors of random normal deviates to 
produce error terms for the price equations. The following equation was used to generate 
weekly packing facility prices: 
~~~ -~ .... -~- -~-
\ (1) P=P+AW 
It where Pis a vector of historical weekly price means, A is the factored variance-covari-ance matrix, and W is a vector of random standard normal deviates. 
Once simulated, packing facility prices are reduced 20 percent to account for the 
markup and handling costs between the packing facility and the wholesale market. Prices 
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equivalent to Dallas wholesale prices can be obtained only if Three Rivers delivers 
directly to supermarket buyers or can otherwise bypass the wholesale market. Currently 
Three Rivers does market small quantities of produce to supermarket buyers. However, at 
the level of more than 1000 acres of produce, as is simulated in this analysis, Three 
Rivers would have to market almost exclusively through wholesalers unless an invest-
ment in trucks beyond what is currently owned is made. 
Besides being reduced 20 percent to account for the Dallas markup, producer prices 
are also reduced by the value of the average cost of packing as calculated under the 
tonnage, hours of operation, and per crate cost assignment rules. Under the sales revenue 
cost assignment method, producer prices are not reduced by the cost of packing since 
costs are determined as a percentage of revenues. 
Spring season prices are simulated for broccoli and cabbage, summer prices for cu-
cumbers, tomatoes, okra and cantaloupes, and fall prices for cabbage, turnips and 
broccoli. Means and standard deviations for the weekly producer and the packing facility 
prices are calculated for each crop.} Weekly prices are converted to weekly revenues 
for each crop using the harvest schedule, which contains the weekly percentage of the 
total harvest volume. The resulting revenues can be summed for all crops that a particu 
lar class of farmer produces. 
Farmer Classes 
Producers are grouped into classes in this study according to the crop mixes actually 
selected by producers who currently market through Three Rivers. Crop mixes of each 
farmer class, rather than individual crops, were the basic unit of study in this analysis 
because there are too many possible combinations of the ten crops to analyze. Moreover, 
the objective of this work is to analyze a specific case rather than provide results which 
are generalizable to other cropping situations. 
In this case, two groups of producers grow one crop only, two produce two crops, 
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three produce three crops, and three produce six of the nine crops. Broccoli and cabbage 
are grown in two seasons and each season is considered a different crop. Crops grown by 
individual growers in each class are presented in Table VI. Total crops grown in each 
class are shown in Table VII. The percentage contribution to crop and seasonal pool 
production in terms of acres of each class are shown in Tables VIII and IX. These per-
centages are used to calculate the participation in revenue pools. Since the timing of de-
livery by class is not known and percentage of rejected crates is assumed constant across 
classes, calculation of participation rates in revenue pools can be based on acreage 
planted. 
Distribution of Revenues 
After weekly prices are generated for the packing facility and estimated for the 
producers, revenues are calculated for the different classes of farmers. Three revenue 
distribution rules are simulated: no pooling, crop pooling and seasonal pooling. The 
seasonal pooling option is equivalent to Buccola and Subaei's "grouped" pooling except 
that the groups in this analysis consist of spring, summer and fall seasons rather than a 
fruit-vegetable dichotomy. The crop pooling option is also equivalent to Buccola and 
Subaei's "multiple" pooling in which revenues are distributed according to participation 
in a particular crop's pool of revenues. 
Under the no-pool rule, producer revenues are the producer prices generated multi-
plied by the quantity packed and sold in a given week. Neither revenues nor costs are 
pooled, which is the current payment system at Three Rivers. The effect of such a system 
is that individual producers do not share price risk with other producers. Although the 
producers ultimately assume the price risk, in any given week the packing facility as-
sumes the price risk since ~t does not know the price it will receive when it quotes a 
market price to the producer. 
Per acre producer returns under crop pooling are calculated for each jth class of pro-
TABLE VI 
PER FARM CROP ACREAGE BY CLASS 
Class Number Number SPB SPC CUC TOM CAN OK TUR FC FB 
of Farms of Crops 
- - - - - - - - - - - -Acres- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
1 2 1 0 10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2 3 1 0 0 0 0 10 0 0 0 0 
3 2 2 0 0 0 5 0 5 0 0 0 
4 3 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 10 10 0 
5 2 3 0 0 10 5 0 5 0 0 0 
6 3 3 0 5 5 5 0 0 0 0 0 
7 5 3 3 5 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 
8 5 6 3 0 8 7 10 0 3 0 8 
9 5 6 0 4 8 6 22 0 0 12 8 




TOTAL CROP ACREAGE BY CLASS 
Producer 
Class SPB SPC CUC TOM CAN OK TUR FC FB Total Acres 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Acres - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ., 
1 0 20 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 20 
2 0 0 0 0 30 0 0 0 0 30 
3 0 0 0 10 0 10 0 0 0 20 
4 0 0 0 0 0 0 30 30 0 60 
5 0 0 20 10 0 10 0 0 0 40 
6 0 15 15 15 0 0 0 0 0 45 
7 15 25 0 0 0 0 0 10 0 50 
8 15 0 40 35 50 0 15 0 40 195 
9 0 20 40 30 110 0 0 60 40 300 
10 50 20 35 0 110 0 15 0 40 270 




PERCENT AGE OF CROP PRODUCTION BY CLASS 
Class SPB SPC CUC TOM CAN OK TUR FC FB 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Percent - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
1 0.0 20.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 10.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
3 0.0 0.0 0.0 10.0 0.0 50.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 50.0 30.0 0.0 
5 0.0 0.0 13.3 10.0 0.0 50.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
6 0.0 15.0 10.0 15.0 0.0 0.0 . 0.0 0.0 0.0 
7 18.8 25.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 10.0 0.0 
8 18.8 0.0 26.7 35.0 16.7 0.0 25.0 0.0 33.3 
9 0.0 20.0 26.7 30.0 36.7 0.0 0.0 60.0 33.3 
10 62.5 20.0 23.3 0.0 36.7 0.0 25.0 0.0 33.3 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
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TABLE IX 
PERCENTAGE OF SEASONAL PRODUCTION BY CLASS 
-Spring-- Summer Fall __ 
Class SPB SPC CUC TOM CAN OK TUR FC FB 
1 0.0 11.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
2 0.0 0.0 0.0 5.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
3 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.8 0.0 1.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 
4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 10.7 10.7 0.0 
5 0.0 0.0 3.5 1.8 0.0 1.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 
6 0.0 8.3 2.6 2.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
7 8.3 13.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 3.6 0.0 
8 8.3 0.0 7.0 6.1 8.8 0.0 5.4 0.0 14.3 
9 0.0 11.1 7.0 5.3 19.3 0.0 0.0 21.4 14.3 
10 27.8 11.1 6.1 0.0 19.3 0.0 5.4 0.0 14.3 
Total 44.4 55.6 26.3 17.5 52.6 3.5 21.4 35.7 42.9 
ducer in the following manner: 
n. 
(2) 1ti = i [PROFITii * PCRTii] I CLACREi, 
i=l 
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where PROFITii is the net packing revenues (net of packing costs) less farm level variable 
production costs of each ith crop in the jth class, PCRTii is the percentage of total packed 
crates for each of the ith crop in the jth class, and CLACREi is the total acres planted by 
producers in the jth class. Per acre producer profits under seasonal pooling are calculated 
for each jth class of pwducer using the following equation. 
(3) n. --
1t. =i [(POOLk *_(PYMT .. I SEASk))- (PROD .. * PCRT..)] I CLACREj 
J lJ lJ lJ 
i=l 
where POOl;., is the ~th seasonal pool of net packing facility revenues (net of packing 
costs allocated on per crate, tonnage or hours of operation basis), PYMTii is the ith 
producer's gross revenues for the jth class, SEASk is the kth seasonal pool of gross pro-
ducer revenues for all crops grown in that season, and PROD; is the ith crop's farm level 
variable costs of production for the jth class. 
Per acre producer returns under no-pooling are simulated with equation (2) except 
PROFITii in this caseJs the stochastic producer revenues (rather than the packing facility 
revenues) reduced bf the average cost of packing and the farm level variable costs of pro-
a 
duction. Using either-\)ooling rule the packing facility is assured of covering all of its 
costs, but not in the np-pool case. 
In the final subroutine (VALCOS) called by the main program, costs are allocated to 
revenue pools according to each pool's contribution to total sales revenue of the packing 
facility. Equations (2) and (3) are used to generate crop and seasonal pools, respectively, 
although several of the variables are defined differently. In equation (2), PROFIT .. is 
lJ 
defined using the following equation. 
( 4) PROFITii = REVNUEii - PRODii - (V ARCPCii *CRA TES;i) - FCii 
where REVNUEii is packing facility revenues for the ith crop in the jth class, V ARCPCii 
is the unit variable packing costs for the ith crop in the jth class, CRA TESii is the total 
number of crates packed for the ith crop in the jth class, and FCii is defined by 
equation (5):· 
(5) FC.. = FIXCOS * (REVNUE.fPOOL) 
1J 1 
In equation (5) the variable FIXCOS contains total fixed packing costs for the packing 
facility and POOL represents total gross annual packing facility revenues. 
To calculate returns under seasonal pooling in V ALCOS the variable POOLk in 
equation (3), is calculated with the following formula: 
(6) POOLk = REVNUEk- (FIXCOS*(POOLCJPOOL)) 
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where REVNU~ is the kth seasonal pool of packing facility revenues less total variable 
costs of packing of each crop in the kth seasonal pool, POOL~ is the kth seasonal pool 
of gross annual packing facility revenues, and FIX COS is the total fixed packing costs for 
all crops packed. 
CHAPTER IV 
SIMULATION RESULTS AND STOCHASTIC DOMINANCE ANALYSIS 
This chapter presents the results of the price and yield simulation and the analysis of 
the returns to the producers. The eleven scenarios are first analyzed for ten classes of pro-
ducers using a mean-variance criterion. The strategies identified using the EV criterion 
as preferred are compared with the results of the stochastic dominance with respect to a 
function analysis. The SDRF analysis is conducted for three risk preference intervals. 
The implications of the results for management of the packing facility are discussed in 
ChapterV. 
Prices and Yields 
Prices and yields were simulated in this study due to the lack of sufficient historical 
data. Weekly Dallas wholesale prices for a ten-year period were used as the basis for (""-
"-, 
generating weekly prices for 75 iterations of the simulation model. ~~isto~~~.~2~~~- ]\ 
formation is available for Southeastern Oklahoma. Estimates of the maximum, minimum ( 
~----··-----·······"·~-· """ ______ ... -~ ... '---.. '" -----------.--------......... .. 
arul._~odal yield values were used to generate the yield data with a triangular distribution . 
. ----·-·· ~--··--·~- ...... ···---····--· - .. ~-~·-· 
Weekly prices were generated for the harvest weeks of the nine crops for the packing 
facility. Producer prices were estimated as deviations from the generated facility prices. 
A uniformly distributed random error of a maximum 10 percent was generated and used 
to estimate the producer prices as deviations from the facility prices. The ten percent 
deviation was selected to represent the maximum error that the packing facility manage-
ment is expected to commit in estimating prices to pay the producers before knowing the 
market price that the facility will receive. 
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Table X presents the means and standard deviations of the simulated weekly prices 
~---
as well as the historical weekly price means and standard deviations. Table X also 
presents the results of the t-tests of the means and Chi-Square tests of the variances of the 
simulated facility prices and historical prices. At the 5 per cent level, significantly differ-
ent means were generated for two weeks of spring broccoli facility prices, one week of 
the tomato facility prices, and three weeks of cantaloupe facility prices. Chi-Square 
tests at the 5 per cent level determined that variances significantly different from histori-
cal values were generated for one week of spring broccoli, one week of cucumber prices, 
and one week of tomato prices. Overall, the simulated facility prices appear to do a good 
job of representing the historical series of weekly prices. 
The'{):leans and standard deviations of the generated yields are presented in Table XI. __ _______ .. ,.--~··-· ~----
The maximum and minimum generated values are presented as well. The generated 
values fall within the specified limits, which can be found in Table IV. Using the gener-
ated yields, packing costs are calculated each iteration. The means and standard devia-
tions of the per crate packing costs under each of the cost allocation rules are presented in 
Table XII. 
Some differences in means and variability of per crate packing costs can be found 
across the cost allocation methods. For example, mean per crate packing costs for spring 
broccoli range from $2.47 under sales value allocation to $3.68 under tonnage allocation. 
The standard deviations for fall broccoli range from .11 to .53 per crate and spring broc-
coli standard deviations range from .09 to 1.11 per crate. Other crop means and standard 
deviations under the four cost allocation methods vary less dramatically. Cucumber per 




COMPARISON OF GENERA TED PRICES AND IDSTORICAL DATA 
Week Facility Producer Historical T-test Chi-
Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Square 
Spring Broccoli 
-----------------------Dollars per crate------------------
20 8.28 1.323 8.29 1.397 7.93 1.20 2.322* 90.22 
21 8.26 1.313 8.28 1.387 7.92 1.10 2.275* 106.10** 
22 8.04 1.060 8.04 1.181 7.83 1.22 1.755 55.96 
23 8.14 1.195 8.07 . 1.268 8.09 1.34 0.380 58.92 
24 8.41 1.367 8.37 1.389 8.27 1.28 0.858 84.40 
Spring Cabbage 
20 5.88 2.019 5.84 2.007 5.98 2.096 -0.43 68.66 
21 6.44 2.850 6.50 2.920 6.43 3.190 0.039 59.06 
22 6.06 1.830 6.12 1.903 6.09 2.098 -0.11 56.30 
Cucumbers 
23 11.16 2.442 11.09 2.476 11.08 2.057 0.255 104.20** 
24 12.51 2.613 12.41 2.742 12.46 2.583 0.157 75.70 
25 11.44 2.948 11.41 3.020 11.80 2.799 -1.05 82.12 
26 11.61 3.185 11.63 3.375 11.80 3.157 -0.51 75.31 
27 11.09 2.110 10.90 2.102 11.35 2.037 -1.06 79.40 
28 11.97 2.211 11.98 2.386 11.73 2.211 0.910 74.05 
29 11.43 2.107 11.33 2.218 11.52 1.821 -0.39 99.04 
30 9.87 1.440 9.81 1.472 9.93 1.378 -0.33 80.83 
31 8.96 1.204 8.97 1.317 9.13 1.138 -1.19 82.84 
32 8.95 0.930 8.89 1.075 8.95 0.897 0.023 79.55 
33 8.51 1.057 8.50 1.141 8.53 0.925 -0.12 96.66 
34 8.47 1.218 8.45 1.347 8.35 1.135 0.853 85.10 
35 8.64 1.156 8.58 1.287 8.64 1.131 0 77.26 
36 9.64 1.645 9.56 1.730 9.55 1.781 0.473 63.11 
37 9.42 1.351 9.52 1.400 9.31 1.370 0.688 71.92 
38 9.41 1.278 9.52 1.437 9.35 1.319 0.406 69.51 
39 9.82 1.814 9.72 1.790 9.78 1.882 0.214 68.76 
* Facility price means tested at 5% level significantly different from historical price 
means 
** Facility price variances tested at 5% level significantly different from historical price 
variances 
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TABLE X (Continued) 
Week Facility Producer Historical T-test Chi-
Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Square 
Tomatos 
-----------------------Dollars per crate-------------------
23 8.88 1.679 8.77 1.711 8.66 1.739 1.121 68.99 
24 9.05 1.980 '9.17 2.086 8.70 2.158 1.519 62.29 
25 8.86 2.448 8.84 2.523 8.59 2.802 0.972 56.51 
26 8.13 1.719 8.14 1.764 7.80 2.067 0.667 51.17** 
27 7.55 1.167 7.69 1.300 7.36 1.273 1.387 62.14 
28 7.25 0.781 7.30. 0.794 7.19 0.721 0.687 86.85 
29 7.42 1.204 7.48 1.260 7.48 1.211 -0.43 73.07 
30 7.36 2.276 7.44 2.282 7.78 2.340 -1.60 69.97 
31 7.08 1.983 7.07 1.993 7.31 2.075 -1.01 67.56 
32 7.07 1.980 7.06 2.003 7.51 1.937 -1.93 77.34 
33 6.29 1.642 6.34 1.699 6.64 1.656 -1.82 72.72 
34 6.01 1.230 5.97 1.274 6.30 1.211 -2.04* 76.33 
Cantaloupe 
28 8.28 0.918 8.25 1.042 8.30 0.849 -0.16 86.46 
29 8.25 0.719 8.22 0.857 8.11 0.649 1.679 90.85 
30 8.25 0.751 8.41 0.945 8.04 0.705 2.442* 83.98 
31 7.98 0.846 7.94 0.922 7.72 0.889 2.633* 67.12 
32 7.84 0.834 7.86 1.035 7.64 0.830 2.101 * 74.78 
33 7.50 1.152 7.43 1.173 7.35 1.256 1.108 62.17 
34 7.21 0.800 7.18 0.892 7.20 0.788 0.081 76.11 
35 7.59 0.774 7.70 0.914 7.48 0.878 1.258 57.46 
36 7.46 0.537 7.49 0.652 7.34 0.626 1.934 54.34 
37 7.91 0.729 7.84 0.824 7.75 0.737 1.929 72.39 
38 8.09 0.429 8.11 0.715 8.03 0.470 1.210 61.51 
Okra 
27 7.26 1.621 7.22 1.636 7.32 1.469 -0.30 90.03 
28 7.36 1.662 7.29 1.714 7.43 1.597 -0.33 80.19 
29 7.40 1.388 7.42 1.465 7.43 1.275 -0.15 87.79 
30 6.83 1.084 6.88 1.194 6.83 1.049 0.039 79.13 
31 6.52 1.143 6.50 1.182 6.45 1.150 0.530 73.11 
32 6.69 1.098 6.70 1.165 6.63 1.091 0.512 74.94 
33 6.46 1.213 6.38 1.220 6.38 1.147 0.602 82.78 
34 6.12 1.169 6.08 1.213 6.01 1.092 0.792 84.80 
35 5.95 1.297 6.01 1.375 5.86 1.142 0.580 95.41 
36 6.03 1.365 5.98 1.3'72 5.93 1.245 0.665 89.03 
37 6.09 1.541 6.00 1.590 5.98 1.375 0.646 92.82 
38 6.46 1.692 6.50 1.724 6.40 1.484 0.306 96.25 
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TABLE X (Continued) 
Week Facility Producer Historical T-test Chi-
Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Square 
Turnips 
-----------------------Dollars per crate-------------------
40 6.24 0.278 6.23 0.429 6.23 0.283 0.020 71.29 
41 6.06 0.440 6.06 0.549 6.06 0.466 0 66.10 
42 6.03 0.444 6.02 0.552 6.01 0.455 0.024 70.48 
43 5.92 0.512 5.81 0.575 5.91 0.515 0.014 73.17 
44 5.80 0.464 5.76 0.590 5.83 0.512 -0.03 60.78 
45 5.58 0.592 5.61 0.656 5.63 0.673 -0.06 57.40 
46 5.50 0.633 5.49 0.690 5.54 0.736 -0.05 54.76 
47 5.33 0.754 5.27 0.790 5.37 0.870 -0.06 55.68 
48 5.14 0.896 5.13 0.933 5.19 1.025 -0.08 56.56 
Fall Cabbage 
44 5.72 1.033 5.71 1.034 5.65 1.006 0.578 77.93 
45 5.60 1.027 5.58 1.040 5.58 1.054 0.210 70.16 
46 6.04 1:968 6.06 1.995 5.99 1.875 0.219 81.54 
47 5.68 1.588 5.68 1.662 5.65 1.573 0.185 75.39 
48 5.52 1.396 5.50 1.387 5.48 1.379 0.260 75.93 
49 5.35 1.815 5.38 1.865 5.35 1.830 -0.00 72.82 
Fall Broccoli 
38 8.62 1.028 8.74 1.188 8.45 0.96 1.44 84.18 
39 8.63 1.538 8.74 1.489 8.89 1.50 -1.45 77.88 
40 8.41 1.364 8.44 1.460 8.55 1.30 -0.86 82.07 
41 8.73 1.596 8.70 1.766 8.41 1.49 1.73 85.09 
42 9.11 1.902 9.16 2.027 8.97 1.74 0.66 88.47 
43 8.28 1.345 8.27 1.394 8.45 1.27 -1.11 83.19 
44 8.07 1.168 8.14 1.306 8.07 1.13 0.00 79.03 
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TABLE XI 
GENERA TED YIELDS PER ACRE 
Crop Mean Std Dev Maximum Minimum 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -Crates Per Acre- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
SPB 513.12 146.03 711.92 248.42 
SPC 708.55 189.69 948.71 321.33 
cue 489.50 158.95 699.61 230.67 
TOM 1011.06 312.55 1498.54 543.14 
CAN 464.83 125.49 629.99 252.10 
OK 707.82 209.21 988.72 341.43 
TUR 774.01 170.54 999.17 456.18 
FC 769.78 197.14 976.10 339.30 




PER CRATE PACKING COSTS BY COST 
ALLOCATION METHOD 
Tons Hours 
Mean Std Dev Mean StdDev Mean StdDev 
Sales Value* 
Mean StdDev 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Dollars Per Crate - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
SPB 3.34 0.72 3.68 1.11 3.19 0.61 2.47 0.09 
SPC 1.49 0.05 1.63 0.08 1.45 0.04 1.48 0.16 
cue 1.82 0.06 2.00 0.09 1.90 0.06 2.07 0.10 
TOM 1.64 0.05 1.51 0.04 1.60 0.04 1.75 0.10 
CAN 2.02 0.07 2.03 0.08 1.93 0.07 2.07 0.08 
OK 1.68 0.05 1.43 0.02 2.75 0.17 1.72 0.09 
TUR 2.3 0.05 2.25. 0.04 2.44 0.05 2.29 0.06 
FC 1.49 0.05 1.63 0.08 1.45 0.04 1.47 0.11 
FB 2.79 0.34 2.86 0.53 2.72 0.29 2.53 0.11 




Analysis of Producer Returns 
The means, standard deviations, ranges, skewness and coefficients of variation of the 
returns simulated for each class of producer under each of the eleven scenarios are pre-
sented in Table Xlll. A perusal of the means and standard deviations across classes 
reveals that Class 1 producers experience the highest levels of variation in returns. Class 
3 and 5 producers achieve the highest mean returns per acre. Class 1 and 7 producers 
have the greatest possibility of realizing negative returns, as non-positive returns are 
possible for each of the cost allocation and revenue distribution strategies. Variability of 
mean returns differs across strategies most noticeably for Class 2 and 3 producers, whose 
mean returns vary across strategies by $1100 and $1400 per acre, respectively. In 
contrast, the mean returns for Class 1 producers do not vary across strategies by more 
than $125. 
With the exception of Class 2 producer returns and one strategy of Class3 producer 
returns, producer returns are positively skewed. Skewness varies relatively little across 
strategies for each class of producer, with the exception of Classes 1, 3, 5, and 7. The 
influence of skewness on expected utility is positive. Other things being equal, higher 
positive skewness increases expected utility for all risk averse individuals with decreas-
ing or constant absoute risk-aversion for increases in monetary wealth (Tsiang). The 
implication of this result is that cost allocation and revenue distribution rule combinations 
that are more positively skewed should be in the efficient sets of the more risk averse 
decision makers, other things being the same. 
According to the minimum return levels, Class 1, 2, 3, 5, and 7 producers face the 
possibility that in a given year they will face negative returns. Class 1 and 3 producers 
have the potential of earning a negative return of more than $1000 per acre, depending 
on the cost allocation and revenue distribution method selected. However, Class 1 
producers have the potential to earn the highest maximum returns per acre, in excess of 
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TABLEXill 
RETURNS TO PRODUCERS: STATISTICS BY CLASS AND STRATEGY* 
Strategy Mean StdDev Maximum Minimum Skewness CV 
Class 1: Spring Cabbage 
----------------------Dollars per acre---------------------
CrtCrp 1620.77 1516.71 7035.40 -727.40 .93 .94 
CrtNop 1640.28 1554.69 7484.30 -709.20 1.10 .95 
CrtSea 1661.94 1521.32 7356.90 -761.80 .96 .92 
HrsCrp 1648.13 1519.94 7062.60 -721.80 .93 .92 
HrsNop 1668.59 1559.21 7522.10 -701.20 1.10 .93 
HrsSea 1683.85 1523.27 7355.70 -744.20 .96 .90 
TonCrp 1528.28 1505.65 6903.70 -751.40 .94 .99 
TonNop 1543.93 1539.32 7355.40 -736.40 1.12 1.00 
TonSea 1587.31 1514.88 7313.60 -821.30 .95 .95 
ValCrp 1585.21 1463.65 6731.00 -1323.00 .79 .92 
ValSea 1530.85 1350.47 6488.80 -787.30 .98 .88 
Class 2: Cantaloupe 
CrtCrp 1462.47 554.73 2417.00 441.80 -.14 .38 
CrtNop 1458.54 538.84 2460.60 523.40 -.10 .37 
CrtSea 1460.13 547.70 2446.50 505.10 -.11 .38 
HrsCrp 1499.92 563.33 2454.00 469.90 -.14 .38 
HrsNop 1496.41 548.68 2511.10 545.10 -.11 .37 
HrsSea 1497.85 557.05 2492.40 527.50 -.12 .37 
TonCrp 1456.45 551.37 2408.00 439.30 -.14 .38 
TonNop 1453.05 537.41 2453.20 520.30 -.10 .37 
TonSea 1454.36 545.65 2437.00 500.60 -.12 .38 
ValCrp 402.70 279.78 1113.10 -173.60 .18 .69 
ValSea 475.87 280.69 1250.20 -53.80 .20 .59 
*Crt: Per crate basis of cost allocation 
Hrs: Hours of packing line operation cost allocation basis 
Ton: Contribution to total tonnage cost allocation basis 
Val: Contribution to sales value in a revenue pool basis of cost allocation 
Crp: Crop pool revenue distribution method 
Nop: No pooling revenue distribution method 
Sea: Seasonal pool revenue distribution method 
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TABLE XIII (Continued) 
Strategy Mean StdDev Maximum Minimum Skewness CV 
Class 3: Tomatos and Okra 
----------------------Dollars per acre---------------------
CrtCrp 1871.29 876.09 4130.40 429.50 .49 .47 
CrtNop 1877.71 862.64 4076.50 446.80 .46 .46 
CrtSea 1879.10 881.04 4119.00 396.00 .49 .47 
HrsCrp 1552.98 869.34 3779.20 10.90 .49 .56 
HrsNop 1556.61 . 835.76 3646.10 47.60 .44 .54 
HrsSea 1558.43 853.16 3692.90 12.00 .47 .55 
TonCrp 2007.50 889.91 4292.50 570.40 .49 .44 
TonNop 2015.50 885.85 4268.90 582.10 .46 .44 
TonSea 2016.17 903.60 4310.80 514.60 .49 .45 
ValCrp 598.52 973.96 2731.00 -1872.70 -.04 1.63 
ValSea 676.46 878.85 2635.90 -1482.60 .14 1.30 
Class 4: Turnips and Fall Cabbage 
CrtCrp 1352.57 582.66 2880.50 260.60 .48 .43 
CrtNop 1343.48 565.61 2760.00 212.40 .39 .42 
CrtSea 1356.12 574.87 2790.70 207.00 .31 .42 
HrsCrp 1342.84 583.64 2868.90 250.80 .47 .43 
HrsNop 1334.17 566.40 2748.30 215.40 .39 .42 
HrsSea 1344.29 574.80 2783.20 208.20 .33 .43 
TonCrp 1339.53 578.43 2869.50 245.30 .48 .43 
TonNop 1327.80 560.60 2740.40 172.20 .39 .42 
TonSea 1348.84 573.09 2759.90 162.00 .25 .42 
ValCrp 1377.47 562.47 2841.80 319.50 .46 .41 
ValSea 1478.24 535.45 2912.90 421.60 .53 .36 
Class 5: Cucumbers, Okra, and Tomatos 
CrtCrp 2082.52 676.62 3691.90 538.20 .29 .32 
CrtNop 2078.94 659.38 3697.50 545.10 .26 .32 
CrtSea 2080.99 681.63 3733.30 505.40 .31 .33 
HrsCrp 1906.39 678.28 3499.50 318.80 .28 .36 
HrsNop 1900.95 646.75 3461.20 335.10 .24 .34 
HrsSea 1903.52 669.08 3501.60 304.50 .29 .35 
TonCrp 2111.21 . 673.11 3731.80 577.60 .31 .32 
TonNop 2107.12 657.04 3744.30 588.40 .29 .31 
TonSea 2109.36 681.10 3778.60 537.90 .33 .32 
ValCrp 1411.33 719.59 3060.80 -621.50 .07 .51 
ValSea 1381.23 679.96 2965.40 -445.80 .08 .49 
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TABLE Xill (Continued) 
Strategy Mean StdDev Maximum Minimum Skewness cv 
Class 6: Spring Cabbage, Cucumbers, and Tomatos 
----------------------Dollars per acre---------------------
CrtCrp 1867.76 783.20 3685.00 291.60 .17 .42 
CrtNop 1876.80 776.40 3837.30 281.70 .20 .41 
Crt Sea 1886.28 799.84 3810.60 291.80 .22 .42 
HrsCrp 1876.98 783.39 3697.80 302.60 .17 .42 
HrsNop 1886.39 778.41 3858.00 288.50 .20 .41 
HrsSea 1893.83 798.79 3813.90 296.70 .21 .42 
TonCrp 1849.36 785.13 3674.80 258.60 .17 .42 
TonNop 1857.13 775.63 3828.00 262.40 .21 .42 
TonSea 1873.82 807.77 3827.80 282.60 .24 .43 
ValCrp 1798.62 769.98 3551.70 276.70 .14 .43 
ValSea 1716.43 737.43 3377.80 182.10 .17 .43 
Class 7: Spring Cabbage, and Spring and Fall Broccoli 
CrtCrp 1355.58 838.63 4628.00 -307.90 .86 .62 
CrtNop 1335.98 845.25 4746.90 -233.00 1.10 .63 
CrtSea 1362.58 840.22 4657.60 -308.30 .85 .62 
HrsCrp 1392.27 838.36 4657.20 -272.10 .86 .60 
HrsNop 1377.35 848.40 4797.20 -208.30 1.09 .62 
HrsSea 1398.17 839.59 4684.80 -272.70 .85 .60 
TonCrp 1255.28 839.08 4523.80 -423.10 .83 .67 
TonNop 1219.69 835.28 4604.70 -300.80 1.13 .68 
TonSea 1265.53 841.91 4557.90 -423.30 .80 .67 
ValCrp 1435.28 . 809.18 4529.80 -422.60 .74 .56 
ValSea 1393.68 790.42 4415.20 -400.80 .77 .57 
Class 8: Spring and Fall Broccoli, Cucumbers, Tomatos, 
Cantaloupe and Turnips 
CrtCrp 1539.48 421.82 2929.50 833.50 .90 .27 
CrtNop 1524.90 393.39 2790.40 846.30 .90 .26 
Crt Sea 1535.66 417.34 2890.20 823.00 .90 .27 
HrsCrp 1553.96 420.47 2938.30 846.90 .90 .27 
HrsNop 1542.05 395.15 2813.00 860.60 .90 .26 
HrsSea 1551.22 417.78 2903.20 834.90 .90 .27 
TonCrp 1538.08 423.86 2933.80 824.20 .90 .28 
TonNop 1515.24 393.57 2774.10 837.30 .90 .26 
TonSea 1531.50 418.60 2889.70 823.00 .90 .27 
ValCrp 1280.91 404.58 2584.90 525.00 .83 .32 
ValSea 1287.05 401.47 2554.30 554.00 .85 .31 
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TABLE XIII (Continued) 
Strategy Mean StdDev Maximum Minimum Skewness cv 
Class 9: Spring and Fall Cabbage, Cucumbers, Tomatos, 
Cantaloupe and Fall Broccoli 
----------------------Dollars per acre---------------------
CrtCrp 1591.19 398.32 2635.10 812.60 .33 .25 
CrtNop 1586.09 381.41 2568.70 839.00 .34 .24 
CrtSea 1595.15 400.50 2654.40 800.10 .35 .25 
HrsCrp 1615.20 397.64 2654.70 833.00 .33 .25 
HrsNop 1611.44 384.04 2599.40 861.80 .34 .24 
HrsSea 1618.89 401.60 2677.00 815.70 .34 .25 
TonCrp 1562.09 397.70 2607.40 793.50 .33 .25 
TonNop 1552.88 378.35 2531.90 804.60 .35 .24 
TonSea 1567.31 398.26 2626.50 783.50 .36 .25 
ValCrp 1194.52 366.58 2150.10 572.30 .49 .31 
ValSea 1153.35 358.69 2107.90 545.00 .51 .31 
Class 10: Spring and Fall Broccoli, Spring Cabbage, 
Cucumbers, Cantaloupe and Turnips 
CrtCrp 1395.03 326.16 2230.80 673.30 .29 .23 
CrtNop 1370.42 302.41 2120.10 707.90 .19 .22 
Crt Sea 1385.05 318.58 2216.70 677.30 .28 .23 
HrsCrp 1419.28 326.55 2248.70 696.00 .28 .23 
HrsNop 1398.39 306.08 2156.10 727.10 .18 .22 
HrsSea 1410.54 320.44 2239.10 696.90 .27 .23 
TonCrp 1357.84 326.04 2204.50 634.30 .29 .24 
· TonNop 1321.10 297.77 2055.40 662.60 .19 .23 
TonSea 1344.21 315.88 2181.60 641.20 .30 .23 
ValCrp 1025.81 276.57 1756.20 434.40 .29 .27 
ValSea 1060.85 281.58 1774.10 489.20 .22 .27 
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$7000 under particular strategies. 
The difficulty for any class of producer to determine which combination of cost allo-
cation and revenue distribution rules is preferred from the raw statistics is apparent. 
Potential producers desiring to detemline whether they should grow 1, 2, 3 or 6 crops can 
get an indication from the statistics that one- crop specialists can experience high levels 
of risk, but that it varies by crop. For example, Class 1 and 2 producers are both one-crop 
classes, but spring cabbage appears to be much riskier than cantaloupe. In addition, 
cantaloupe producers are more vulnerable than cabbage producers to the effects of the 
selection of the cost allocation and revenue distribution rule. 
Plots of the means and standard deviations of the per acre producer returns for the 
ten classes of producers are shown in Figures 6-15. From the plots, many of the combi-
nations of cost allocation and revenue distribution can be easily eliminated from consid-
eration. For example, using the mean-variance criterion , Class 1 producers (Figure 6) 
prefer HrsSea over HrsNop, CrtNop and TonNop because selection of HrsSea results in 
the higher mean with a lower level of variability. However, no decision can be made be-
tween HrsSea and those strategies located to the left and below it using the mean-vari-
ance criteria because the mean returns under the HrsSea strategy are highest but so is its 
variability of returns, albeit only slightly in the cases of CrtSea, HrsCrp, TonSea, and 
TonCrp. 
In Figure 7, Class 2 producers would prefer hours of operation cost allocation over 
per crate or tonnage for the same revenue distribution method. For example, HrsCrp 
would always be preferred over CrtCrp and TonCrp. The mean-variance criteria does not 
help to select the risk efficient strategy from among HrsNop, HrsSea and HrsCrp how-
ever. Strategies using value of sales revenue as a cost allocation strategy do not appear in 
Figure 7 because the inean values and standard deviations were so low compared to the 
other strategies (See Table Xlll). 
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Figure 6. Means and Standard Deviations of Per Acre Producer Returns 
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Class 4 Crops: Turnips 
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Class 5 Crops: Cucumbers, 
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Class 6 Crops: Spring Cabbage . 
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Class 7 Crops: Spring Broccoli, 
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Figure 13. Means and Standard Deviations of Per Acre Producer Returns 
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Class 10 Crops: Spring Broccoli, 
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to CrtCrp and CrtSea, and HrsNop to HrsSea and HrsCrp using a mean-variance criteria. 
Which of the three no pooling revenue distribution rules is preferred, however, rests with 
the risk attitude of the producers, although it seems that considerable mean returns are 
sacrificed for relatively minor decreases in variation in returns if a producer preferred 
HrsNop over TonNop. 
In the case of Class 4 producers, the preferred strategy using EV analysis is ValSea, 
which in Figure 9, has the highest mean return with the lowest variability. It would seem 
that Class 5 (Figure 10) producers would prefer the TonNop strategy over all others given 
that it has the highest mean return and less variability than all other strategies except 
HrsNop. In Figure 11, Class 6 producers would prefer HrsNop to CrtCrp, TonCrp, 
HrsCrp, CrtSea, HrsSea and, TonSea using EV analysis. No decision can be made 
between HrsNop and the strategies lying below it and to the left using EV analysis. 
Class 7 producers (Figure 12) similarly can easily identify ValCrp as the dominant 
strategy using EV analysis, although no decision can be made between ValCrp and 
V alSea. Visual inspection of Figure 13 shows that for Class 8 producers HrsNop appears 
to be the preferred strategy given its position of highest mean returns and almost the 
lowest standard devation of returns. Certainly no rational producer would prefer CrtSea, 
TonSea, TonCrp, CrtCrp, HrsSea, or HrsCrp all of which have less or equivalent mean 
returns and similar or more variability than does HrsNop. 
Class 9 (Figure 14) producers would appear to prefer no pooling revenue distribution 
to either crop or seasonal pooling revenue distribution given its high mean return and 
relatively low standard deviation of returns compared to the other sets of strategies. It is 
doubtful that value of sales contribution cost allocation strategies, ValCrp and ValSea, 
experience enough of a drop in variability to make up for the relatively large decrease in 
mean returns for either strategy to be a preferred one. Strictly applying the EV criteria, 
however, leads to the conclusion that HrsNop dominates CrtCrp, CrtSea, TonCrp and 
TonSea, but no decision can be made regarding HrsNop, CrtNop and TonNop. 
Class 10 (Figure 15) producers likewise would prefer the no pooling revenue distri-
bution method over seasonal and crop pooling methods. It would seem that HrsNop is 
again the preferred strategy with ValSea being a possible alternative depending on 
producer risk attitudes. 
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Given the limitations of the mean-variance analysis, the results were analyzed using 
stochastic dominance with respect to a function (SDRF). The risk intervals used are 0 to 
.005, .005 to .01, and .01 to .015. The lower limit of each risk interval is represented by 
R1 and the upper limit is represented by R2 in the results of the the SDRF analysis shown 
in Appendix D. The first interval includes risk neutral to slightly risk averse attitudes. 
The second interval encompasses moderate risk aversion, and the third interval includes 
fairly strongly risk averse producers, according to the Buccola and Subaei study. 
These intervals were used by Buccola and Subaei, whose outcome variables were 
also per acre returns from horticulural crops, and thus can be considered relevant ranges 
for this study. (See Raskin and Cochran, 1986, for their discussion of the need to exercise 
caution when Arrow-Pratt intervals from one study are used as secondary data in another 
study). 
The results of the SDRF analysis are presented in Appendix D. For each classs of 
producer and each risk interval, pairwise comparisons are made between each of the 
eleven strategies with every other strategy. Identification of the strategies which are un-
dominated by any other strategy for a given risk interval are indicated with a star. Un-
dominated strategies are in the efficient set for producers whose Arrow-Pratt risk coeffi-
cient falls in the interval indicated and as such are the preferred strategy. Table XIV lists 
by class the undominated strategies for each interval. 
The undominated strategies as identified by the SDRF analysis can now be com-
pared with the preferred strategies indicated using the EV approach. According to the 
SDRF results, a Class 1 producer with fairly strong risk aversion would prefer the 
HrsNop strategy. This result contradicts the EV results which show that HrsSea domi-
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nates HrsNop. The SDRF result can be explained somewhat by the statistics in Table 
XIII. The maximum and minimum values are higher for HrsNop than HrsCrp and so is 
the skewness, all factors ignored by the EV analysis. Thus, the EV criterion is useful to 
identify the dominant strategy among a group of strategies with similar variability in 
returns, but the stochastic dominance analysis results are needed to identify specific 
undominated strategies for given levels of risk aversion. 
In the case of Class 2 producers, the EV criterion performed well in identifying 
strategies using hourly cost allocation as the potential efficient set. The SDRF analysis 
confirms these choices, but eliminates HrsCrp and HrSea from the efficient set for fairly 
strongly to moderately risk averse producers since their standard deviations of returns are 
higher and maximum and minimum returns are lower than those of HrsNop. 
Class 3 producer preference for the no pooling revenue distribution method over 
crop or seasonal pooling as identified previously by the EV criterion is confirmed by the 
SDRF analysis. TonNop dominates TonCrp and TonSea because of its lower variability 
and similar mean return level. Skewness is about the same for the three strategies. 
The efficient set identified using EV analysis is confirmed by the SDRF analysis for 
Class 4 producers at all levels of risk aversion. ValSea has the highest mean, lowest stan-
dard deviation and highest skewness of all strategies. Selection of the efficient set for 
Class 5 producers is similarly straightforward. Inspection of Figure 10 led to the conclu-
sion that TonNop would be preferred to strategies lying to the right and below it on the 
EV graph. The SDRF analysis confirms this result . 
As previously mentioned, Class 6 producers would seem to prefer HrsNop or possi-
bly ValSea depending on attitudes toward risk aversion (Figure 11). The SDRF analysis 
does not confirm the choices determined by the EV approach. Moreover, the SDRF 
results are not easy to explain for Class 6 producers. For producers in the most risk 
averse category, HrsCrp is the dominant strategy, a curious result considering it has a 
lower mean, higher standard deviation, lower maximum, and slightly lower skewness 
than does HrsNop. The only clue as to why HrsCrp dominates HrsNop lies in the fact 
that the minimum value of HrsNop is lower than that of HrsCrp. Even more curious is 
the fact that HrsCrp falls out of the efficient set for risk neutral to slightly risk averse 
producers, leaving HrsSea and HrsNop in the efficient set. 
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In the case of Class 7, again unexpected SDRF results conflict with what the EV 
analysis would indicate. As discussed, under the EV approach, ValCrp would appear to 
dominate all other strategies. However, HrsNop is the dominant strategy for fairly 
strongly to moderately risk averse producers. This result is understood by noting in Table 
XIII that HrsNop has a higher maximum and minimum return than either of the other 
hourly cost allocation strategies or ValCrp. HrsNop also has a higher skewness than does 
HrsSea, HrsCrp or ValCrp. 
In the case of Class 8 producers, HrsNop was previously identified using the EV 
criterion as dominating the majority of other strategies. The SDRF analysis confirms that 
HrsNop is in the efficient set for fairly strongly to moderately risk averse producers. For 
risk neutral producers, HrsCrp and HrsSea enter the efficient set, due to the fact that the 
higher risk is compensated for by the higher mean and maximum values that these latter 
two strategies attain. 
For Class 9 producers the EV criteria previously identified no pooling as the pre-
ferred revenue distribution method for any given cost allocation method. The SDRF 
I 
analysis shows that (Table XIV) HrsNop is the dominant strategy for the producers 
falling in the most risk averse categories. HrsNop is preferred because of its lower stan-
dard deviation of returns, despite its lower mean. HrsNop also has the highest minimum 
return of all strategies and the highest maximum return compared to HrsCrp and HrsSea. 
As indicated by the EV analysis, HrsNop is the preferred strategy, but only for the 
fairly strongly risk averse Class 10 producers. As risk aversion decreases the efficient set 
changes. HrsCrp and HrsSea enter the set at moderate risk aversion levels. With little or 
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TABLE XIV 
UNDOMINATED COMBINATIONS OF COST ALLOCATION 
AND REVENUE DISTRIBUTION RULES 
Fairly Strongly Moderately Risk Neutral to 
Risk Averse Risk Averse Slightly Risk 
Averse 
Interval .01 - .015 .005- .01 0.0- .005 
Class 
1 HrsNop HrsNop, ValSea HrsNop, HrsSea, 
ValSea 
2 HrsNop HrsNop HrsCrp, HrsNop, 
HrsSea 
3 TonNop TonNop TonNop, TonSea 
4 ValSea ValSea ValSea 
5 TonNop TonNop TonSea, TonNop 
6 HrsCrp HrsCrp, HrsNop, HrsNop, HrsSea 
HrsSea 
7 HrsNop HrsNop HrsCrp, HrsNop, 
HrsSea, ValCrp 
ValSea 
8 HrsNop HrsNop HrsCrp, HrsNop, 
HrsSea 
9 HrsNop HrsNop HrsCrp, HrsNop 
HrsSea 
10 HrsNop HrsCrp, HrsNop HrsCrp 
HrsSea 
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no risk aversion the rational producer would prefer HrsCrp. This change in the efficient 
set can be explained by the fact that under HrsCrp the producer who is not averse to 
higher levels of risk can attain both higher maximum levels of returns and on the average 
higher mean returns than under HrsNop. The impact of skewness appears to be over-
whelmed in this case, since HrsNop has the lowest skewness of the three hourly cost 
allocation strategies. 
The results of the simulation model were analyzed in this chapter. The efficient set 
of cost allocation and revenue distribution rules differred according to the product mix 
grown and producers' risk attitudes. The efficient sets were identified using both a 
mean-variance criterion and stochastic dominance with respect to a function. More 
precise efficient sets were specified for groups of producers according to their attitude 
toward risk using SDRF, which is the preferred method if there is reason to suspect that 
producers have a risk attitude other than risk neutrality. What have not been elicited in 
this study are the attitudes towards risk that the Southeastern Oklahoma fresh produce 
growers actually hold. 
CHAPTER V 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
This objective of this study was to examine the impacts on producer returns of alter 
native cost allocation and revenue distribution rules in a multi-product fresh produce 
packing facility under conditions of stochastic yields and prices. Preference for specific 
combinations of rules for a given class of producers was specified using both a mean-
variance criterion and stochastic dominance with respect to a function and the results of 
applying these two criteria were compared. This chapter summarizes the results and 
provides recommendations for the Three Rivers packing facility management. 
The value of using the SDRF approach over the mean-variance method was demon-
strated in this thesis. Identification of the risk efficient alternatives at different risk 
aversion levels is only possible using the SDRF approach. Not only is the mean-vari-
ance approach not able to order risky alternatives at different levels of risk aversion, it is 
not able to take into account other information besides the first two moments of the 
distribution of returns as is SDRF. For example, Class 7 producers under the EV crite-
rion would seem to select ValCrp as the preferred strategy as it has the highest mean and 
second to the lowest variance of returns. However, at the two higher risk aversion levels, 
Class 7 producers preferred HrsNop to ValCrp for its higher maximum and minimum re-
turns, and higher skewness. 
The results show that as risk aversion increases, the efficient set of cost allocation 
and revenue distribution rules narrows from five strategies in the least risk averse cate-
gory to one strategy in the most risk averse category for each class of producer. In the 
most risk averse category analyzed, eight of the ten classes of producers preferred no 
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pooling revenue distribution, according to the SDRF results. Seven of the ten classes 
preferred hourly cost allocation. In addition, the policy selected affects the variability of 
the returns to the specialized producers more than the returns to the more diversified pro-
ducers. For example, the standard deviation of returns varied by more than $200 across 
strategies for Class 1 producers (spring cabbage) and almost $300 for Class 2 producers 
(cantaloupe). In contrast, the standard deviation of returns varied across strategies by less 
than $30 for Class 8 producers who grew six crops in all three seasons. Thus, one can 
conclude from these results that cost allocation and revenue distribution rules can indeed 
affect producer returns and that sensitivity to the rules selected depends on both the risk 
attitudes held by the producers and also the diversity of crops grown. 
Classes 3, 4 and 5 were the only groups of producers at fairly strong risk aver-
sion levels that did not prefer hourly cost allocation. Class 4 producers who harvested 
only fall crops preferred percentage of sales value in allocating costs. Not surprisingly, 
the fall crops were lower value crops. Class 3 and 5 producers who grew summer crops 
only preferred tonnage cost allocation. Producers in these latter classes are the only two 
that do not produce cantaloupe or cabbage, two heavy crops. The sensitivity of crop 
mixes to alternative strate~es is demonstrated with Classes 3, 4, and 5. 
Seasonal pooling and percentage of value in the seasonal pool for allocation of costs 
(V alSea) is the risk efficient alternative at all risk aversion levels in the case of Class 4 
growers who raise turnips and fall cabbage. However, this same choice in the case of 
Class 5 producers, who grow cucumbers, okra and tomatoes, rather than seasonal pool-
ing and tonnage cost allocation (TonSea), would lead to a loss of approximately $500 per 
acre in mean returns and an increase of about $120 in the variability of returns for Class 5 
producers. Rules favoring fall growers would be made at the expense of summer growers. 
Overall, hourly cost allocation and no pooling revenue distribution were in the effi-
cient set most often at all risk aversion levels and in particular in the more diversified 
producer classes (Classes 8, 9 and 10 farmers grew 6 crops). However, the apparent 
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consensus of these results does not lead to quick or easy recommendations on the adop-
tion of specific cost allocation and revenue distribution rules. For example, the use of 
the no pooling revenue distribution rule results in a situation where the packing facility 
assume.s all of the price risk , which may be unacceptable to the packing facilily manage-
ment. Under no pooling, the producer is paid before the packing facility knows what the 
facility will be paid. This arrangement is untenable in the long run, particularly after 
subsidization of the facility is ended. The rationality of spreading the price risk across a 
pool of revenues rather than allowing the packing facility to assume the price risk might 
not occur to the growers until they take over management of the facility and are more 
. directly in charge of insuring its survivability. 
Taking Class 9 and 10 crops mixes as examples, assuming that the growers 
decide to spread price risk across a pool of revenues, the decision becomes whether to 
pool revenues by crop or by season. In the case of Class 9, for any cost allocation 
method selected, seasonal pooling results in lower variability of returns for the same 
mean level of returns. In the case of Class 10, for any given cost allocation method, 
crop pooling results in lower variability of returns for the same mean level of returns. 
Both Class 9 and 10 crop mixes contain 6 crops. Thus, the composition of the crop mix 
is critical in determining whether the variance of returns, as one might intuitively expect, 
is decreased by widening the revenue pool from a crop to a seasonal basis. Moreover, the 
relative importance that producers attach to reduction of variability versus some other 
objectives such as minimizing the probability of negative returns is not known. This 
complicates the task of forming specific revenue distribution rule recommendations for 
use by the packing facility. 
Cost allocation recommendations are less difficult than revenue distribution sugges-
tions. In a multi-product packing facility where the products vary in weight per crate, 
using tonnage or per crate basis would be hard to justify to producers as means to allo-
cate fixed costs. In addition, contribution to sales revenue might also be difficult for the 
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management to rationalize for allocation of fixed costs, particularly if some relatively 
low value crops are heavy machine users. Use of hours of operation is more defensible 
on economic grounds, since machinery costs are more directly tied to the actual users of 
the equipment In this regard, it might be the recommended cost allocation method, in ad-
dition to the fact that it was the most commonly preferred cost allocation method for the 
more diversified risk averse producers and at the two highest risk aversion levels. 
Since specialized producers can be expected to be more vulnerable to changes in 
cost allocation and revenue distribution rules than are more diversified producers, a pack-
ing facility whose objective is to encourage small producers to adopt new crops will need 
to carefully consider the rules under which to operate. Otherwise, new producers may be 
subjected to increased riskiness or reduced mean returns simply by virtue of the rules de,. 
termined by the packing facility. Such new producers quickly might become discour-
aged. 
Several caveats should be kept in mind regarding these results. This study does not 
test these results for every individual crop and every combination of crops possible but 
only examines the specific crop mixes actually handled by Three Rivers packing facility. 
In addition, this analysis did not capture differences in timing of delivery of produce to 
the packing facility over the course of the harvest season that occur within a class of 
producers. These differences may be of particular importance in the summer season 
which lasts up to seventeen weeks long for cucumbers. In addition, such information 
might provide the basis for analyzing pooling of revenues from multiple crops during a 
given time frame, such as a week or two-week period. 
Further research efforts in this area might include a more sophisticated yield simula-
tion approach when historical yields become available, and the use of non-normal distri-
butions for simulation of the price equation errors. Direct elicitation of the intervals used 
in the SDRF analysis is recommended in future work rather than using intervals from 
other studies in order to facilitate more specific recommendations. 
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1.3150 1.0881 1.1100 1.2420 1.2982 1.4949 
Okra 1.1935 1.1922 1.3500 1.4306 1.4063 
1.3059 1.3762 15331 1.5288 




0.0806 0.1178 0.0971 0.1203 0.1019 0.0969 0.1102 0.1605 0.1860 
0.2174 0.1615 0.1964 0.1830 0.1888 0.2062 0.2953 0.3549 
0.2075 0.2134 0.1830 0.2104 0.2222 0.2795 0.3285 
0.2654 0.2193 0.2450 0.2619 0.3508 0.4146 
0.2631 0.3344 0.3624 0.4385 0.5183 
Turnips 0.4531 0.4885 0.5650 0.6688 
0.5425 0.6265 0.7313 
o.i5n o.8885 
1.0524 
1.0138 0.9344 1.3792 1.2390 1.1322 1.3138 
1.1124 1.7968 1.5682 1.3870 1.7950 
3.5166 2.9016 2.5073 3.2410 
2.4772 2.1616 2.8084 
Fall Cabbage 1.9017 2.4604 
3.3504 
0.9300 0.9830 0.7116 0.9712 1.4444 0.9633 0.8258 1.4781 
2.2497 1.7189 2.0671 2.0008 1.3707 1.3100 1.8459 
1.6785 1.8018 1.6412 0.9704 0.8811 0.9633 
2.2192 2.2640 1.2118 1.0867 1.3707 
3.0275 1.6574 1.3557 0.9704 
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FACTORED UPPER TRIANGLE MATRICES 
Spring Crops 


















0.0000 0.0040 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.1032 -0.3601 1.1461 -0.3503 -0.1319 -1.4143 0.4316 0.2062 0.6403 
0.0042 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 -0.2542 -0.3409 -0.2115 -0.9296 0.6850 -0.9077 1.1681 0.7957 1.5141 
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 -1.0752 -0.4575 -0.0676 -1.1748 0.2892 -0.8230 -0.7334 0.5421 1.8687 
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 -1.5791 -0.0769 0.3556 -1.1964 0.2168 0.1410 -1.2288 0.6812 1.9683 
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 -0.9751 -0.2213 -0.0081 -1.1232 -0.0335 -0.4389 -0.4910 0.1750 1.1940 
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 -0.6564 0.1981 -0.1608 -0.3907 0.1245 -1.2158 1.5452 0.4656 0.3803 
0.0000 0.0000 1.5590 -0.0623 0.1982 0.0848 0.3488 -0.5879 0.1492 0.5747 0.1325 
0.0000 1.0025 0.6675 -0.1530 -0.4204 0.3728 -0.0530 0.1853 0.2711 0.0143 
Cucumber 0.5821 0.6708 -0.3444 -0.1867 0.1245 -0.4217 -0.1966 0.1640 0.3057 
0.6170 -0.0611 -0.3426 0.2428 -0.3850 0.1752 0.2310 0.1128 
0.2030 0.1594 0.6055 -0.4038 -0.2152 -0.0968 0.4512 
0.2519 0.8420 -0.1544 0.2011 0.3062 0.5997 
0.7129 0.0444 -0.2490 0.4590 0.7060 
0.7637 -0.3386 1.0962 1.1283 
0.2025 1.0691 0.8344 
0.8508 1.0081 
1.8823 
0.0014 0.0000 0.0000 -0.1430 0.1444 -0.3822 -0.9237 -0.2692 0.7508 0.44641 0.9682 -0.4587 
0.0000 0.0000 0.2955 0.6486 0.1320 -1.4170 -0.1632 0.4588 -0.03673 0.9268 -1.0154 
0.0000 0.6318 20518 0.3629 -0.9079 -0.6614 0.4764 -1.14870 0.5503 0.02588 
0.1849 1.3555 0.5060 -0.5300 -0.0847 -0.1907 -0.96959 0.9303 -0.1441 
0.2838 0.0910 -0.1108 0.0365 -0.0129 -0.77367 0.7912 -0.5465 
Tomato 0.4287 0.0442 0.3559 0.1788 -0.39341-0.1405 -0.0195 
0.4003 0.7028 0.7906 0.09751-0.0614 0.41922 
0.9199 0.9362 0.18349 0.5353 1.85292 
1.1467 0.68323 0.41354 1.53636 
1.05044 0.79563 1.42202 
0.90204 1.38931 
1.21039 
0.0005 0.0002 0.1158 -0.4478 -0.0659 -0.2439 0.3784 -0.0760 0.12353 0.39317 0.35407 
0.0001 0.0321 0.09725 0.08865 0.02462 0.1404 -0.2228 -0.3543 0.31925 0.32550 
0.1160 0.18207 0.27848 0.16535 0.0916 -0.1461 -0.2167 0.27838 0.43679 
0.23721 0.66069 0.00179-0.1071 0.27181-0.2066 0.2204 0.35001 
0.57823 0.06931-0.3368 0.15061-0.2066 0.40911-0.0705 
0.29105-0.9418 0.63379 0.32585 0.30864 0.07099 
Cantaloupe 0.25406 0.37232 0.4103 -0.00544 0.50150 
0.40285 0.50533 0.37024 0.46625 





0.0000 0.0008 O.OOll 1.0076 -0.252A 0.2270 0.3319 0.1646 -0.1581 0.0089 -0.1833 0.9134 
0.0014 0.0019 0.8060 -0.0252 0.4738 0.2080 0.0981 -0.6879 0.2788 -0.2782 0.9972 
0.0022 0.6033 0.0797 0.4034 0.4348 0.3520 -0.0862 0.0103 -0.1679 0.8625 
0.3106 -0.0694 0.4900 0.3576 0.1889 -0.0713 0.3357 -0.1065 0.6831 
0.0760 0.3962 0.3905 0.2725 -0.1801 0.3902 0.0386 0.8642 
Okra 0.3403 0.3047 o.1705 -o.on1 0.4112 0.0550 0.8802 
0.4304 0.1796 0.0715 0.2717 0.0630 1.0073 
0.1201 -0.0003 0.3131 0.4279 0.9476 
0.2268 0.1078 0.4262 1.0301 




0.03016 -0.03753 0.00569 -0.01546 0.12860 0.04603 -0.15746 
0.06000 0.08415 -0.01554 0.17366 -0.00590 -0.23250 
0.13503 0.15364 0.17368 0.16946 -0.05972 
0.18450 0.10713 0.15310 -0.18172 
0.06204 0.06231 0.00669 
Tumips 0.06344 0.15529 
0.14%8 
0.2022 0.2934 -0.0584 ·0.2694 0.54372 o.nn6 
0.3099 -0.0353 -0.0598 0.22317 0.98068 
. 0.26708 0.37356 0.41301 Ln063 
0.13896 0.32209 1.53431 
Fall 0.30791 1.34419 
Cabbage 1.83039 
0.3478 0.10217 0.12% -0.21188 0.39920 0.21039 0.73018 
0.35236 -0.00993 0.56130 0.65668 -0.19365 1.15831 
0.3589 0.74622 0.62026 0.03196 o.n909 
0.61455 0.95403 0.08980 0.96088 
1.10933 0.60000 1.19870 
Fall 0.29839 1.23326 
Broccoli 1.13097 
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RESULTS OF STOCHASTIC DOMINANCE WITH RESPECT TO A FUNCTION* 
CLASS 1 
R1= .010000 R2= .015000 Undominated 
CRTCRP 0 1 0 0 ? 1 1 1 1 1 
CRTNOP 1 - 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 
CRTSEA 0 0 - 0 0 0 1 ? 1 1 1 
HRSCRP 1 0 1 - 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 
HRSNOP 1 1 1 1 - 1 1 1 1 1 1 * 
HRSSEA ? 0 1 0 0 - 1 1 1 1 1 
TONCRP 0 0 0 0 0 0 - 0 1 1 ? 
TONNOP 0 0 ? 0 0 0 1 - 1 1 1 
TONSEA 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 - 1 0 
VALCRP 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 - 0 
VALSEA 0 0 0 0 0 0 ? 0 1 1 -
R1= .005000 R2= .010000 
CRTCRP 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 ? 
CRTNOP 1 - 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 ? 
CRTSEA 0 0 - 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 ? 
HRSCRP 1 0 1 - 0 ? 1 1 1 1 ? 
HRSNOP 1 1 1 1 - 1 1 1 1 1 ? * 
HRSSEA 1 0 1 ? 0 - 1 1 1 1 ? 
TONCRP 0 0 0 0 0 0 - 0 1 1 0 
TONNOP 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 - 1 1 ? 
TON SEA 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 - 1 0 
VALCRP 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 - 0 
VALSEA ? ? ? ? ? ? 1 ? 1 1 - * 
R1= .000000 R2= .005000 
CRTCRP ? ? 0 0 0 1 1 1 ? ? 
CRTNOP ? - ? ? 0 ? 1 1 1 1 ? 
CRTSEA ? ? - ? ? 0 1 1 1 1 ? 
HRSCRP 1 ? ? - ? 0 1 1 1 1 ? 
HRSNOP 1 1 ? ? - ? 1 1 1 1 ? * 
HRSSEA 1 ? 1 1 ? - 1 1 1 1 ? * 
TONCRP 0 0 0 0 0 0 - ? ? ? 0 
TONNOP 0 0 0 0 0 0 ? - ? ? ? 
TONSEA 0 0 0 0 0 0 ? ? - ? ? 
VALCRP ? 0 0 o. 0 0 ? ? ? - ? 
VALSEA ? ? ? ? ? ? 1 ? ? ? - * 
• 1 indicates strategy in left hand column dominates 
0 indicates strategy in left hand column is dominated 
? indicates no decision is made 
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RESULTS OF STOCHASTIC DOMINANCE WITH RESPECT TO A FUNCTION* 
CLASS 2 
R1= .010000 R2= .015000 Undominated 
CRTCRP 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 
CRTNOP 1 - 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 
CRTSEA 1 0 - ? 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 
HRSCRP 1 0 ? - 0 0 1 0 ? 1 1 
HRSNOP 1 1 1 1 - 1 1 1 1 1 1 * 
HRSSEA 1 1 1 1 0 - 1 1 1 1 1 
TONCRP 0 0 0 0 0 0 - 0 0 1 1 
TONNOP 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 - 1 1 1 
TON SEA 1 0 0 ? 0 0 1 0 - 1 1 
VALCRP 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
VALSEA 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 -
R1= .005000 R2= .010000 
CRTCRP 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 
CRTNOP 1 - 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 
CRTSEA 1 0 - 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 
HRSCRP 1 0 1 - 0 0 1 ? 1 1 1 
HRSNOP 1 1 1 1 - 1 1 1 1 1 1 * 
HRSSEA 1 1 1 1 0 - 1 1 1 1 1 
TONCRP 0 0 0 0 0 0 - 0 0 1 1 
TONNOP 1 0 1 ? 0 0 1 - 1 1 1 
TON SEA 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 - 1 1 
VALCRP 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 - 0 
VALSEA 0 0 0 0 () 0 0 0 0 1 -
R1= .000000 R2= .005000 
CRTCRP ? ? 0 0 0 1 ? ? 1 1 
CRTNOP ? - ? ? 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 
CRTSEA ? ? - 0 0 0 1 ? 1 1 1 
HRSCRP 1 ? 1 - ? ? 1 1 1 1 1 * 
HRSNOP 1 1 1 ? - ? 1 1 1 1 1 * 
HRSSEA 1 1 1 ? ? - 1 1 1 1 1 * 
TONCRP 0 0 0 0 0 0 - ? ? 1 1 
TONNOP ? 0 ? 0 0 0 ? - ? 1 1 
TON SEA ? 0 0 0 0 0 ? ? - 1 1 
VALCRP 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 - 0 
VALSEA 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 -
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RESULTS OF STOCHASTIC DOMINANCE WITH RESPECT TO A FUNCTION 
CLASS 3 
Rl= .010000 R2= .015000 Undominated 
CRTCRP 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 
CR1NOP 1 - 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 
CRTSEA 0 0 - 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 
HRSCRP 0 0 0 - 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 
HRSNOP 0 0 0 1 - 1 0 0 0 1 1 
HRSSEA 0 0 0 1 0 - 0 0 0 1 1 
TONCRP 1 1 1 1 1 1 - 0 1 1 1 
TONNOP 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 - 1 1 1 * 
TON SEA 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 - 1 1 
VALCRP 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 - 0 
VALSEA 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 -
R1= .005000 R2= .010000 
CRTCRP 0 ? 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 
CR1NOP 1 - 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 
CRTSEA ? 0 - 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 
HRSCRP 0 0 0 - 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 
HRSNOP 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 
HRSSEA 0 0 0 1 0 - 0 0 0 1 1 
TONCRP 1 1 1 1 1 1 - 0 1 1 1 
TONNOP 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 - 1 1 1 * 
TON SEA 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 - 1 1 
VALCRP 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 - 0 
VALSEA 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 -
Rl= .000000 R2= .005000 
CRTCRP 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 
CR1NOP 1 - ? 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 
CRTSEA 1 ? 1 1 1 0 0 0 . 1 1 
HRSCRP 0 0 0 - 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 
HRSNOP 0 0 0 1 - ? 0 0 0 1 1 
HRSSEA 0 0 0 1 ? - 0 0 0 1 1 
TONCRP 1 1 1 1 1 1 - 0 ? 1 1 
TONNOP 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 - ? 1 1 * 
TON SEA 1 1 1 1 1 1 ? ? - 1 1 * 
VALCRP 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 - 0 
VALSEA 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 -
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RESULTS OF STOCHASTIC DOMINANCE WITH RESPECT TO A FUNCTION 
CLASS 4 
R1= .010000 R2= .015000 Undominated 
CRTCRP 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 
CRTNOP 0 - 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 
CRT SEA 0 0 - 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 
HRSCRP 0 1 1 - 1 1 ? 1 1 0 0 
HRSNOP 0 0 1 0 - 1 0 1 1 0 0 
HRSSEA 0 0 0 0 0 - 0 1 1 0 0 
TONCRP 0 1 1 ? 1 1 - 1 1 0 0 
TONNOP 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 - 1 0 0 
TON SEA 0 0 0 0 0 0 .o 0 - 0 0 
VALCRP 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 - 0 
VALSEA 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 - * 
R1= .005000 R2= .010000 
CRTCRP 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 
CRTNOP 0 - 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 
CRT SEA 0 0 - 0 ? 1 0 1 1 0 0 
HRSCRP 0 1 1 - 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 
HRSNOP 0 0 ? 0 - 1 0 1 1 0 0 
HRSSEA 0 0 0 0 0 - 0 ? 1 0 0 
TONCRP 0 1 1 1 1 1 - 1 1 0 0 
TONNOP 0 0 0 0 0 ? 0 - 1 0 0 
TONSEA 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 - 0 0 
VALCRP 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 - 0 
VALSEA 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 - * 
R1= . 000000 R2= . .005000 
CRTCRP ? ? 1 1 1 1 1 ? 0 0 
CRTNOP ? - ? ? 1 ? ? 1 ? 0 0 
CRT SEA ? ? - ? 1 1 ? 1 1 0 0 
HRSCRP 0 ? ? - ? ? ? ? ? 0 0 
HRSNOP 0 0 0 ? - ? ? ? ? 0 0 
HRSSEA 0 ? 0 ? ? - ? ? ? 0 0 
TONCRP 0 ? ? ? ? ? - ? ? 0 0 
TONNOP 0 0 0 ? ? ? ? - ?· 0 0 
TON SEA ? ? 0 ? ? ? ? ? - 0 0 
VALCRP 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 - 0 
VALSEA 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 - * 
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RESULTS OF STOCHASTIC DOMINANCE WITH RESPECT TO A FUNCTION 
CLASS 5 
R1= .010000 R2= .015000 Undominated 
CRTCRP 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 ? 1 1 
CRTNOP 1 - 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 
CRT SEA 0 0 - 1 1 1 0 0 ·0 1 1 
HRSCRP 0 0 0 - 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 
HRSNOP 0 0 0 1 - 1 0 0 0 1 1 
HRSSEA 0 0 0 0 0 - 0 0 0 1 1 
TONCRP 1 1 1 1 1 1 - 0 1 1 1 
TONNOP 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 - 1 1 1 * 
TONSEA ? 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 - 1 1 
VALCRP 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 - 0 
VALSEA 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 -
R1= .005000 R2= .010000 
CRTCRP 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 
CRTNOP 1 - 1 1 1 1 0 0 ? 1 1 
CRTSEA 0 0 - 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 
HRSCRP 0 0 0 - 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 
HRSNOP 0 0 0 1 - 1 0 0 0 1 1 
HRSSEA 0 0 0 0 0 - 0 0 0 1 1 
TONCRP 1 1 1 1 1 1 - 0 1 1 1 
TONNOP 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 - 1 1 1 * 
TON SEA 1 ? 1 1 1 1 0 0 - 1 1 
VALCRP 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 - 0 
VALSEA 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 -
R1= .000000 R2= .005000 
CRTCRP ? ? 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 
CRTNOP ? - ? 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 
CRT SEA ? ? - 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 
HRSCRP 0 0 0 - ? ? 0 0 0 1 1 
HRSNOP 0 0 0 ? - ? 0 0 0 1 1 
HRSSEA 0 0 0 ? ? - 0 0 0 1 1 
TONCRP 1 1 1 1 1 1 - ? 1 1 1 * 
TONNOP 1 1 1 1 1 1 ? ? 1 1 * 
TONSEA 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 ? - 1 1 
VALCRP 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 - ? 
VALSEA 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ? -
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RESULTS OF STOCHASTIC DOMINANCE WITH RESPECT TO A FUNCTION 
CLASS 6 
R1= .010000 R2= .015000 Undominated 
CRTCRP 1 0 0 ? 0 1 1 1 1 1 
CRTNOP 0 - 0 0 0 0 1 1 ? 1 1 
CRTSEA 1 1 - 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 
HRSCRP 1 1 1 - 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 * 
HRSNOP ? 1 0 0 - 0 1 1 1 1 1 
HRSSEA 1 1 1 0 1 - 1 1 1 1 1 
TONCRP 0 0 0 0 0 0 - 0 0 0 1 
TONNOP 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 - 0 ? 1 
TONSEA 0 ? 0 0 0 0 1 1 - 1 1 
VALCRP 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 ? 0 - 1 
VALSEA 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -
R1= .005000 R2= .010000 
CRTCRP ? 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 
CRTNOP ? - ? 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 
CRTSEA 1 ? - 0 ? 0 1 1 1 1 1 
HRSCRP 1 1 1 - ? ? 1 1 1 1 1 * 
HRSNOP 1 1 ? ? - ? 1 1 1 1 1 * 
HRSSEA 1 1 1 ? ? - 1 1 1 1 1 * 
TONCRP 0 0 0 0 0 0 - 0 0 ? 1 
TONNOP 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 - ? 1 1 
TONSEA 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 ? - 1 1 
VALCRP 0 0 0 0 0 0 ? 0 0 - 1 
VALSEA 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -
R1= .000000 R2= .005000 
CRTCRP 0 0 0 0 0 1 ? ? 1 1 
CRTNOP 1 - ? ? 0 ? 1 1 1 1 1 
CRTSEA 1 ? - ? ? 0 1 1 1 1 1 
HRSCRP 1 ? ? - 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 
HRSNOP 1 1 1 - ? 1 1 1 1 1 * 
HRSSEA 1 ? 1 1 ? - 1 1 1 1 1 * 
TONCRP 0 0 0 0 0 0 - 0 0 1 1 
TONNOP ? 0 0 0 0 0 1 - ? 1 1 
TON SEA ? 0 0 0 0 0 1 ? - 1 1 
VALCRP 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 - 1 
VALSEA 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -
112 
RESULTS OF STOCHASTIC DOMINANCE WITH RESPECT TO A FUNCTION 
CLASS 7 
R1= .010000 R2= .015000 Undominated 
CRTCRP 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 
CRTNOP 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 
CRTSEA 0 0 - 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 
HRSCRP 1 0 1 - 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 
HRSNOP 1 1 1 1 - 1 1 1 1 1 1 * 
HRSSEA 1 0 1 0 0 - 1 1 1 1 1 
TONCRP 0 0 0 0 0 0 - 0 1 0 0 
TONNOP 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 - 1 1 1 
TON SEA 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 - 0 0 
VALCRP 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 - 0 
VALSEA 0 0 0 0 0 ·o 1 0 1 1 -
R1= .005000 R2= .010000 
CRTCRP 0 1 0 0 0 1 ? 1 1 1 
CRTNOP 1 - 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 
CRTSEA 0 0 - 0 0 0 1 ? 1 1 1 
HRSCRP 1 0 1 - 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 
HRSNOP 1 1 1 1 - 1 1 1 1 1 1 * 
HRSSEA 1 0 1 0 0 - 1 1 1 1 1 
TONCRP 0 0 0 0 0 0 - 0 1 0 0 
TONNOP ? 0 ? 0 0 0 1 - 1 1 ? 
TON SEA 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 - 0 0 
VALCRP 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 - 0 
VALSEA 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 ? 1 1 -
R1= .000000 R2= .005000 
CRTCRP ? ? 0 0 0 1 1 1 ? ? 
CRTNOP ? - ? ? 0 ? 1 1 1 ? ? 
CRT SEA ? ? - 0 0 0 1 1 1 ? ? 
HRSCRP 1 ? 1 - ? ? 1 1 1 ? ? * 
HRSNOP 1 1 1 ? - ? 1 1 1 ? ? * 
HRSSEA 1 ? 1 ? ? - 1 1 1 ? ? * 
TONCRP 0 0 0 0 0 0 - ? ? 0 0 
TONNOP 0 0 0 0 0 0 ? - ? ? 0 
TON SEA 0 0 0 0 0 0 ? ? - 0 0 
VALCRP ? ? ? ? ? ? 1 ? 1 - ? * 
VALSEA ? ? ? ? ? ? 1 1 1 ? - * 
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RESULTS OF STOCHASTIC DOMINANCE WITH RESPECT TO A FUNCTION 
CLASS 8 
R1= .010000 R2= .015000 Undominated 
CRTCRP 0 ? 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 
CRTNOP 1 - 1 ? 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 
CRT SEA ? 0 - 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 
HRSCRP 1 ? 1 - 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 
HRSNOP 1 1 1 1 - 1 1 1 1 1 1 * 
HRSSEA 1 0 1 0 0 - 1 1 1 1 1 
TONCRP 0 0 0 0 0 0 - 0 1 1 1 
TONNOP 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 - 1 1 1 
TONSEA 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 - 1 1 
VALCRP 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 - 0 
VALSEA 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 -
R1= .005000 R2= .010000 
CRTCRP 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 
CRTNOP 1 - 1 ? 0 ? 1 1 1 1 1 
CRT SEA 1 0 - 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 
HRSCRP 1 ? 1 - 0 ? 1 1 1 1 1 
HRSNOP 1 1 1 1 - 1 1 1 1 1 1 * 
HRSSEA 1 ? 1 ? 0 - 1 1 1 1 1 
TONCRP 0 0 0 0 0 0 - 0 1 1 1 
TONNOP 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 - 1 1 1 
TON SEA 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 - 1 1 
VALCRP 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 - 0 
VALSEA 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 -
R1 = .000000 R2= .005000 
CRTCRP ? ? 0 0 0 1 ? 1 1 1 
CRTNOP ? - ? 0 0 0 ? 1 ? 1 1 
CRTSEA ? ? - 0 0 0 ? ? 1 1 1 
HRSCRP 1 1 1 - ? ? 1 1 1 1 1 * 
HRSNOP 1 1 1 ? - ? 1 1 1 1 1 * 
HRSSEA 1 1 1 ? ? - 1 1 1 1 1 * 
TONCRP 0 ? ? 0 0 0 - ? 1 1 1 
TONNOP ? 0 ? 0 0 0 ? - ? 1 1 
TON SEA 0 ? 0 0 0 0 0 ? - 1 1 
VALCRP 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 - 0 
VALSEA 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -
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RESULTS OF STOCHASTIC DOMINANCE WITH RESPECT TO A FUNCTION 
CLASS9 
Rl= .010000 R2= .015000 Undominated 
CRTCRP - 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 
CRTNOP 1 - 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 
CRTSEA 0 0 - 0 0 0 1 ? 1 1 1 
HRSCRP 1 0 1 - 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 
HRSNOP 1 1 1 1 - 1 1 1 1 1 1 * 
HRSSEA 1 0 1 0 0 - 1 1 1 1 1 
TONCRP 0 0 0 0 0 0 - 0 0 1 1 
TONNOP 0 0 ? 0 0 0 1 - 1 1 1 
TONSEA 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 
VALCRP 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 - 1 
VALSEA 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -
Rl= .005000 R2= .010000 
CRTCRP - 0 ? 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 
CRTNOP 1 - 1 ? 0 ? 1 1 1 1 1 
CRTSEA ? 0 - 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 
HRSCRP 1 ? 1 - 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 
HRSNOP 1 1 1 1 - 1 1 1 1 1 1 * 
HRSSEA 1 ? 1 0 0 - 1 1 1 1 1 
TONCRP 0 0 0 0 0 0 - 0 0 1 1 
TONNOP 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 - 1 1 1 
TONSEA 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 - 1 1 
VALCRP 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 - 1 
VALSEA 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -
Rl= .000000 R2= .005000 
CRTCRP ? 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 
CRTNOP ? - ? 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 
CRTSEA 1 ? - 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 
HRSCRP 1 1 1 - ? ? 1 1 1 1 1 * 
HRSNOP 1 1 1 ? - ? 1 1 1 1 1 * 
HRSSEA 1 1 1 ? ? - 1 1 1 1 1 * 
TONCRP 0 0 0 0 0 0 - ? 0 1 1 
TONNOP 0 0 0 0 0 0 ? - ? 1 1 
TON SEA 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 ? - 1 1 
VALCRP 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 - 1 
VALSEA 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -
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RESl]LTS OF STOCHASTIC DOMINANCE WITH RESPECT TO A FUNCTION 
CLASS 10 
R1= .010000 R2= .015000 Undominated 
CRTCRP 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 
CRTNOP 1 - 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 l 1 
. CRTSEA 1 0 - 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 
HRSCRP 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 
HRSNOP 1 1 1 1 - 1 1 1 1 . 1 1 * 
HRSSEA 1 1 1 1 0 - 1 1 1 1 1 
TONCRP 0 0 0 0 0 0 - ? 0 1 1 
TONNOP 0 0 0 0 0 0 ? - ? 1 1 
TONSEA 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 ? - 1 1 
VALCRP 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 - 0 
VALSEA 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 -
R1= .005000 R2= .010000 
CRTCRP ? ? 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 
CRTNOP ? - ? 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 
CRTSEA ? ? - 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 
HRSCRP 1 1 1 - ? ? 1 1 1 1 1 * 
HRSNOP 1 1 1 ? - ? 1 1 1 1 1 * 
HRSSEA 1 1 1 ? ? - 1 1 1 1 1 * 
TONCRP 0 0 0 0 0 0 - 1 ? 1 1 
TONNOP 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 - 0 1 1 
TONSEA 0 0 0 0 0 0 ? 1 - 1 
VALCRP 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 - 0 
VALSEA 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 -
R1= .000000 R2= .005000 
CRTCRP 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 
CRTNOP 0 - 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 
CRT SEA 0 1 - 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 
HRSCRP 1 1 1 - 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 * 
HRSNOP 1 1 1 0 - 0 1 1 1 1 1 
HRSSEA 1 1 1 0 1 - 1 1 1 1 1 
TONCRP 0 0 0 0 0 0 - 1 1 1 1 
TONNOP 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 - 0 1 1 
TONSEA 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 - 1 1 
VALCRP 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 - 0 
VALSEA 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 -
APPENDIXE 
COMPUTER PROGRAM CODE 
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C A MULTIPRODUCT PACKING FACll.ITYIS MODELLED UNDER STOCHASTIC YIELD AND PRICE 
C CONDffiONS. ASSETS ARE CLASSIFIED AS STANDARD OR SPECIALTY. COSTS ARE 
C ALLOCATED TO UNIT CROP COSTS ON THE BASIS OF PERCENT AGE OF TOTAL TONNAGE, 
C HOURS OF OPERATION, OR VALUE OF OF SALES, OR PER CRATE. REVENUES ARE 
C DISTRIBUTED ON THE BASIS OF SEASONAL POOLING, CROP 




REAL A VGCOS(9),ACRE(9),TCRTS(9, 75) 
REALARPER(9,17),TCPC(9,75),TOTFX(9,75),VARCP(9) 
REAL PRING(5,2,75),UMMER(17 ,4,75),ALL(10,3,75),CRATE(9,75) 
REAL ARSPR(5,2,75),ARSUM(17,4,75),ARFAL(10,3,75) 
REAL ARSP(5,2,75),ARS(17,4,75),ARF(10,3,75) INTEGER ALLOC 
DATA TCPC/675*0.0N ALC/OtrOTFX/675*0.0/ 










IF(ALLOC .EQ.O) THEN CALL V ALCOS(PRING,UMMER,ALL,ARSP,ARS,ARF, 










SUBROUTINE STOCH (YIELD,NUMCR,MAX,MIN,MODE,K) 
C YIELD DATA IS GENERATED IN THIS SUBROUTINE AND RETURNED TO SUBROUTINE 
C ASSIGN. THIS SUBROUTINE GENERATES A RANDOM UNIFORM DEVIATE AND 
C THEN USING THE TRIANGULAR DISTRIBUTION, CALCULATES A 
C RANDOM YIELD BASED ON MINIMUM, MAXIMUM AND MODAL VALUES 
c 
REAL UN,MAX(9),MIN(9),MODE(9),YIELD(9),PERC(9),RANN0(9) REAL*8 K 
INTEGER NUMCR 
DO 220 L=1,NUMCR 
PERC(L) = (MODE(L)-MIN(L))/(MAX(L)-MIN(L)) UN=RANF(K) 
IF (UN .GT. PERC(L)) GO TO 200 
CLEFT OF MODE 
RANNO(L)=MIN(L) + SQRT((MODE(L)-MIN(L))*(MAX(L)-MIN(L))*UN) 
GOT0210 
200 CONTINUE 










C RETURNS A UNIFORM DEVIATE BETWEEN 0 AND 1.0. 







IF (RANF .LE. ODO .OR. RANF .GE. l.OODO) GOTO 10 RETURN 
END 
SUBROUTINE PRICES (AK,A,R) 
C TillS SUBROUTINE GENERATES THE RANDOM NORMAL DEVIATES AND 
C GENERATES THE CORRELATED EVENTS USING A COFACTORED C VAR-COV ARIANCE 
C MATRIX. TillS SUBROUTINE IS BASED ON WORK BY CLEMENTS, MAPP, AND 
C EIDMAN, 1971. THE INPUT ARGUMENTS ARE: 
C A -THE FACTORED VARIANCE-COVARIANCE MATRIX 
C CRNUM -THE NUMBER OF CROP PRICES CORRELATED AND RANDOMIZED. 
C THE OUTPUT ARGUMENTS ARE: 














C GENERATE RANDOM NORMAL DEVIATES 
DO 61 I=1,17 
UN1=RANF(R) 
UN2=RANF(R) 












C ASSIGN CALCULATES VARIABLE AND FIXED PACKING COSTS FOR 
C A MULTIPRODUCT PACKING FACILITY UNDER STOCHASTIC YIELD CONDffiONS 
C ASSETS ARE CLASSIFIED AS EITHER STANDARD OR SPECIALTY AND THEIR 
C RESPECTIVE COSTS ARE ALLOCATED TO UNIT CROP COSTS ON THE BASIS 
119 
C OF EITHER PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL TONNAGE, HOURS OF OPERATION OR NUMBER OF CRATES 
c 
SUBROUTINE ASSIGN(CPC,AME,HARPER,AVGPC,CRATES,ACRES,TCRT, TOTF,V ARCPC) 
CHARACTER*6 ASSET,AME(9) 
REAL WAGE, FED, STATE, FICA, GENEXP, ADMIN, MININ 
REAL LIFE,INIT,SAL V,OTHER(14 ),PERP AK(9),LABPR(9),LABR(9) 
REAL LABP(9),CAP AC(9),P AKOUT(9),DMPCC(9),ACRES(9) 




REAL TLCPR, TLCP,TLCR,TOTLAB,TOTDMC,TOTV AR,V ARCPC(9) 
REAL EFFW AG,LABOR(9),ACRTOT,SEMIFX,SUMPC(9),A VGPC(9) 























20 READ (5,40,END=30) I,PER 



















C THE NEXT SECTION READS IN CROP DEPENDENT VARIABLES AND 
C CALCULATES MATERIALS AND LABOR COSTS PER CRATE FOR 
C EACH CROP AND SUMS THEM FOR THE PER CRATE VARIABLE COST 
C FOR EACH CROP. 
EFFW AG =WAGE + (W AGE*(FED+STATE+FICA)) 
DO 71 1=1, NCROP 
READ (3,15,END=66) AME(I),CAP AC(I),P AKOUT(I),PERPAK(I), 
1 ACRES(I),DMPCC(I),LABPR(I), LABP(I),LABR(I),POUNDS(I) 
ACTP AK(I) = CAP AC(I)*P AKOUT(I) 
COSTPR(I) = (EFFW AG*LABPR(I))/ACTP AK(I) 
COSTP(I) = (EFFW AG*LABP(I))/ACTP AK(I) 




C CHECK TO SEE IF HARVEST PERCENTAGES ADD TO 1? 
DO 181 1=1,NCROP 
DO 183 J=1.NWEEK 
ADPER(I)=ADPER(I)+HARPER(I,J) 
183 CONTINUE 
IF (ADPER(I) .NE. 1.00) WRITE(*,182) AME(I),ADPER(I) 
181 CONTINUE 
182 FORMAT('0',6X,A7,2X, 'WEEKLY PERCENTAGES ADD TO ',F10.5) 
DO 251 l=1,NCROP 





C END OF FILE STATEMENTS 
91 WRITE(9,94) 
GOT077 
94 FORMAT('END OF FILE ENCOUNTERED IN HARVEST FILE') 
66 WRITE(9,67) 
GOT077 
67 FORMAT(' END OF FILE ENCOUNTERED IN COST FILE') 
93 WRITE(9,88) 
GOT077 
88 FORMAT('END OF FILE ENCOUNTERED IN THE OPTIONS FILE') 
C BEGIN OUTER LOOP CONTROLLING NUMBER OF ITERATIONS 
401 DO 500 L=1,NIT 
CALL STOCH (YGEN,NCROP,YMAX,YMIN, YMODE,P) 




PCRT(I) = TOTCRT(I)*PERP AK(I) 
PACCRT=PACCRT +PCRT(I) 
RCRT = TOTCRT(I) - PCRT(I) 
TLCPR = (PCRT(I)*COSTPR(I)) + (RCRT*COSTPR(I)) 
TLCP = (PCRT(I)*COSTP(I)) 
TLCR = (RCRT*COSTR(I)) 
TOTLAB = TLCPR + TLCP + TLCR 
TOTDMC = PCRT(I) * DMPCC(I) 
TOTV AR = TOTDMC + TOTLAB 
V ARCPC(I) = TOTV AR/PCRT(I) 
120 
LABOR(!) = LABPR(I)+LABP(I)+LABR(I) 
TONS(I) = (PCRT(I)*POUNDS(I))/2000.0 
TOTION=TOITON+ TONS (I) 
CRATES(I,L)=PCRT(I) 
70 CONTINUE 
C TillS PROGRAM SEGMENT ANAL'YZES SPECIALTY AND STANDARD LINE C ASSETS COSTS. 
c 
C STANDARD AND SPECIALTY COSTS ARE CALCULATED 
IF (ALLOC) 63,64,65 
C ALLOCATION ON PER CRATE BASIS 
63 DO 400 M=1.NMACH 










C ALLOCATION ON HOURS OF OPERATION BASIS 
64 DO 31 I=l,NCROP 






DO 200 M=l.NMACH 
DO 220 I=l,NCROP 









C STANDARD AND SPECIALTY COSTS ARE CALCULATED ON A TONNAGE BASIS 
65 DO 300 M=1,NMACH 
DO 320 I=l,NCROP 








C TillS SET OF LOOPS ALLOCATES OVERHEAD COSTS ON THE BASIS OF 
C TONNAGE OR HOURS OF OPERATION AND CALCULATES UNIT TOTAL PACKING 
C COSTS FOR EACH CROP. 
95 DO 299 1=1,NCROP 






96 ALLPER(I)=PCRT(I)!P ACCRT 
295 STDFIX(I)=(ADMIN+GENEXP+MININ+STDEPR+SEMIFX)*ALLPER(I) 
DO 298 M=1,NMACH . 


















DO 550 M=1,NMACH 
VOL(M)=O.O 
550 CONTINUE 



















900 FORMAT(lx,'AVERAGE PACKING COSTS',9f6.2) 
WRITE(7 ,526) 
526 FORMAT('TOTAL PACKING COSTS FOR EACH CROP') 
C WRITE OUT METHOD OF ALLOCATING COSTS: CRATES,TONNAGE OR HOURS 
IF (ALLOC) 135,136,137 
137 WRITE(7,176) 
GOT089 




DO 521 1=1.NCROP 






178 FORMAT('O' ,4X, 'FIXED COSTS ALLOCATED BY CRATES, ALLOC=NEG') 
176 FORMAT('0',4X,'FIXED COSTS ALLOCATED BY TONNAGE, ALLOC=POS') 
177 FORMAT('O', 'FIXED COSTS ALLOCATED BY HOURS OF OPER,ALLOC=ZERO') 






















REAL F ARS(17 ,4,75),F ARF(10,3, 75),FARSP(5,2,75) 
DATA DBUG/1/NCROP/9/NWEEK/17/NWKSP/5/NWKFAU10/ 
DATA NIT!75/Q/1218192DO/NCS/4/NCF!3/NCSP/2/ 
C THE FOLLOWING PROGRAM SEGMENT GENERATES THE RANDOM PRICES FOR 
C EACH OF THE WEEKS OF THE HARVEST SEASON FOR NINE CROPS. 
C PUT SEASONAL AVERAGE PACKING COSTS IN SEPARATE ARRAYS 
OPEN(8,FILE='MEANS') 










C BEGIN OUTER LOOP CONTROLLING NUMBER OF ITERATIONS 
OPEN(3,FILE='MEAN') 
DO 65 1=1,NCROP 
READ(3,70,END= 71) (MEANS(I,J),J=1,NWEEK) 
65 CONTINUE 
CLOSE(3) 








DO 190 1=1,17 
READ(1,13,END=188) (APRCUC(I,J),J=1,17) 
190 CONTINUE 
DO 191 1=1,12 
READ(1,14,END=188) (APRTOM(I,J),J=l,12) 
191 CONTINUE 
DO 192 1=1,11 
READ(l,15,END= 188) (APRCAN(I,J),J=1,11) 
192 CONTINUE 














DO 500 L=1,NIT 



























C NOW ESTIMATE FALL PRICES FOR THE PACKING FACIT.ITY 





















C NOW CALCULATE THE SPRING PRICES 














C END OF OUTER LOOP CONfROLLING NUMBER OF INTERATIONS 
500 CONTINUE 
c 
C CALL COR SUBROUTINE TO PRINf WEEKLY MEANS AND STD DEV. CALL 
COR(SUMR,NIT ,NCS,NWEEK,NAMES) 
DO 150 L=1,NIT 
DO 150 1=1,NWKFAL 




DO 151 L=1,NIT 
DO 151 1=1,NWKSP 
DO 151 1=1,NCSP 
DUMY(1,I,L)=SPRING(1,I,L) 
151 CONfiNUE 
CALL COR(DUMY ,NIT ,NCSP ,NWKSP,NAMESP) 
C THE FOLLOWING PROGRAM SEGMENf GENERATES THE RANDOM PRICES FOR 
C EACH OF THE WEEKS OF THE HARVEST SEASON FOR NINE CROPS. THESE 
C PRICES ARE PAID TO THE PRODUCERS. 
DO 36 L=1,NIT 






C NOW CALCULATE THE 17 WEEKS OF SUMMER PRICES FOR THE FARMER 
CALL PRICES(PRCUC,APRCUC,Q) 
FARS(1,1,L)=PRCUC(1)+MEANS(3,1) 









































C NOW CALCULATE THE 3 WEEKS OF SPRING PRICES FOR THE FARMER 















C CALL COR SUBROUTINE TO PRINT WEEKLY MEANS AND STD DEY. 
C FOR FARMER PRICES 
CALL COR(FARS,NIT,NCS,NWEEK,NAMES) 
DO 850 L=1,NIT 
DO 850 1=l,NWKFAL 
DO 850 1=1,NCF 
DUMY(J,l,L)=F ARF(1,I,L) 
850 CONTINUE 
CALL COR(DUMY,NIT ,NCF,NWKFAL,NAMEF) 
DO 851 L=1,NIT 
DO 851 1=1,NWKSP 





C WRITE OUT FACILITY PRICES,FARM PRICES BEFORE COSTS ARE SUBTRACTED 
C AND FARM PRICES AFTER COSTS ARE SUBTRACTED 
C NOW REDUCE DALLAS PRICES BY 20% 
DO 140 L=1,NIT 
DO 141 J=1,NWEEK 
DO 142 1=1,NCS 
SUMR(J,I,L)=SUMR(J,I,L)*.8 
F ARSUM(J,I,L)=(F ARS(J,I,L)* .8)-A VGPC(I+2) 
142 CONTINUE 
141 CONTINUE 
DO 143 J=1,NWKFAL 
DO 144 1=1,NCF 
FALL(J,I,L)=FALL(J,I,L)*.8 
F ARFAL(J,I,L)=(F ARF(J,I,L)* .8)-A VGPC(I+6) 
144 CONTINUE 
143 CONTINUE 
DO 145 I=1,NWKSP 
DO 146 1=1,NCSP 
SPRING(J,I,L)=SPRING(J,I,L)*.8 
























189 FORMAT('END OF FILE ENCOUNTERED IN FILE AMATRIX') 
71 WRITE(7,73) 
GOT078 






SUBROUTINE COR(PRC,NMT,NCROP ,NWKS,NAME) 
C THIS PROGRAM SEGMENT VERIFIES CALCULATION OF CORRELATED 
C OUTCOMES BY CALCULATING THE MEANS AND STANDARD DEVIATIONS 
REAL BI(4),YM(4),CORCOL(4,75),SQ(75),SSQ(4),V AR(4),STD(4) CHARACTER*6 NAME(4) 
REAL PRC(17,4,75),MEANPR(17,4),STDEV(17,4) 
INTEGER TN,NMT 
DATA BI/4*0.0/SSQ/4*0.0/YM/4*0.0N AR!4*0.0/SQn5*0.0/ 
DATA STD/4*0.0/ 
TN=NMT 
DO 145 L=1,NWKS 





DO 401 L=1,NWKS 
13 DO 14 J=1,NMT 








DO 16 l=1,NCROP 







DO 17 l=1,NCROP 
V AR(I)=SSQ(I)/(TN-1) 
STD(I)= V AR(l)** .5 
STDEV (L,l)=STD(I) 
17 CONTINUE 









408 FORMAT(2X,'CROP MEANS AND STD DEV' J4A19) 
WRITE(8,19) 
19 FORMAT(1X,'WK#',4(3X,'MEANS',3X,'STD. DEV')) 













REAL CPC(9, 75),HARPER(9,17),REFUND(17 ,9,75),CRATES(9,75) 
REAL ACRES(9),TCRT(9,75),PCRT(10,9),PROD(9,75) 












C THIS SEGMENT CREATES A POOL FOR EACH WEEK AND 
C INCLUDES ALL THE REVENUES IN THAT WEEK TO BE DISTRIBUTED 
OPEN(4,FILE='PROD') 
DO 199 1=1,NC 
READ(4,200,END=201) FIX(I),VAR(I) 
199 CONTINUE 
DO 198 1=1,10 
READ(4,202,END=201) CLACRE(I) 
198 CONTINUE 







C OUTER LOOP CONTROLLING NUMBER OF ITERATIONS 
D08 L=1,NIT 
C FIRST THE SPRING CROPS 
D071=1,2 









C NOW FOR THE SUMMER CROPS 
DO 13 1=1,4 











C NOW FOR THE FALL CROPS 
DO 161=1,3 
18 
DO 18 I=1,FALWKS 
REFUND(J,I +6,L)=F ALL(J,1,L)-CPC(1+6,L) 
REVNUE(J,I+6,L)=(REFUND(J,l+6,L)*(CRATES(l+6,L) *HARPER(l+6,J))) 
















C FARM PRODUCTION COSTS CALCULATED FOR ALL ACRES PLANTED OF THAT CROP 














PROD(l+6,L)=(V AR(l +6)*TCRT(l +6,L))+(FIX(l+6)* ACRES(l+6)) 
PROFIT(l+6,L)=(PROFIT(l+6,L)-PROD(I+6,L)) 
CONTINUE 
C COMPUTE PER ACRE PROFITS BY CLASS WHEN NET PACKING REVENUE 
CARE POOLED BY CROP. NET PACKING REVENEUS ARE FACILITY PRICE 
























C NOW CALCULATE MEAN AND STANDARD DEVIATION OF PROmS FOR EACH CLASS 
DO 140 1=1,10 






STDEV (I)=((SUMSQ(I)-(NIT*(MEAN(I)**2)) )/(NIT -1) )** .5 
140 CONTINUE 
C NOW WRITE FARMER PROmS,MEANS & STD DEV BY CLASS WHEN 
C REVENUES ARE POOLED BY CROP 
OPEN(9,FILE='POOLAS') 
WRITE(9,220) 
220 FORMAT(1X,'FARMER PROmS PER ACRE WITH REVENUES POOLED BY CROP') 
DO 222 1=1,10 
WRITE(9,221) I,(CLASS(I,L),L=1,NIT).MEAN(I),STDEV(I) 
222 CONTINUE 
221 FORMAT(1X,'FARMER CLASS',I2,75F10.1,2X,'MEAN PROm',2X,F8.2, 
1 2X,'STANDARD DEVIATION OF PROmS',2X,F8.2) 
C NOW CALCULATE FARMER PROmS BY CLASS WHEN NET PACKING REVENUES 
CARE POOLED BY SPRING, SUMMER AND FALL SEASONS 
























































C NOW CALCULATE MEAN AND STANDARD DEVIATION OF PROFITS FOR EACH CLASS 
DO 144 1=1,10 








C NOW WRITE FARMER PROFITS ,MEANS & STD DEY BY CLASS WHEN 
C REVENUES ARE POOLED BY SEASON 
WRITE(9,226) 
226 FORMAT(1X,'FARMER PROFITS PER ACRE: REVENUES POOLED BY SEASON') 
DO 228 1=1,10 
WRITE(9,227) I,(CLASS(I,L),L=1,NIT),MEAN(I),STDEV(I) 
228 CONTINUE 
227 FORMAT(1X,'FARMER CLASS',I2,75F10.1,2X,'MEAN PROFIT',2X,F8.2, 
1 2X,'STANDARD DEVIATION OF PROFITS',2X,F8.2) 
C NOW CALCULATE FARMER PROFITS BY CLASS WHEN FARMERS ARE PAID A 
C STOCHASTIC PRICE AND NO POOLING OCCURS 
DO 142 1=1,10 

































CLASS(7 ,L)=((PRORT( 1,L)*PCRT(7 ,1 ))+(PROFIT(2,L)*PCRT(7,2)) 











C NOW CALCULATE MEAN AND STANDARD DEVIATION OF PROFITS FOR EACH CLASS 
00 162 1=1,10 






STDEV (I)=( (SUMSQ(I)-(NIT*(MEAN(I)**2)) )/(NIT -1 ))** .5 
162 CONTINUE 
C NOW WRITE FARMER PROFITS,MEANS & STD DEV BY CLASS WHEN 
C NO POOLING IS USED AND PRODUCER ARE PAID STOCHASTIC PRICES 
WRITE(9,326) 
326 FORMAT(1X,'FARMER PROFITS PER ACRE: NO POOLING') 
00 328 1=1,10 
WRITE(9,327) I,(CLASS(I,L),L=1,NIT),MEAN(I),STDEV(I) 
328 CONTINUE 
327 FORMAT(1X,'FARMER CLASS',I2,75F10.1,2X,'MEAN PROFIT' ,2X,F8.2, 





219 FORMAT(1X, 'END OF FILE ENCOUNTERED IN PROD FILE') 
235 RETURN 
134 
SUBROUTINE V ALCOS(SPRJNG,SUMMER,FALL,FARSP,FARS,FARF, 
1 HARPER,AME,CRATES,ACRES,TCRT,TOTFIX,V ARCPC) 
REAL SPRJNG(5,2,75),SUMMER(17,4,75),FALL(10,3,75) 
REAL FARSPR(5,2,75),FARSUM(17,4,75),FARFAL(10,3,75) 
REAL UNPC(9,75) CHARACTER*6 AME(9) 
INTEGER NIT,CLACRE(1 0) 
REAL HARPER(9,17),FC(9,75),POOLSS(4,75),POOLFF(3,75) 
REAL POOLPP(2, 75),SS(75),PP(75),FF(75),CRATES(9,75) 
REAL ACRES(9),TCRT(9,75),PCRT(10,9),PROD(9,75) 












C TH1S SEGMENT CREATES A POOL FOR EACH WEEK 
OPEN(4,FlLE='PROD') 
DO 199 1=1.NC 
READ(4,200,END=201) FIX(I),V AR(I) 
199 CONTINUE 
DO 198 1=1,10 
READ(4,202,END=201) CLACRE(I) 
198 CONTINUE 












C FIRST THE SPRING CROPS 
DO 71=1,2 








C NOW FOR THE SUMMER CROPS 
DO 13 1=1,4 
DO 14 J=1,SUMWKS 









C NOW FOR THE FALL CROPS 
DO 161=1,3 
DO 18 J=1,FALWKS 
REVNUE(J,I+6,L)=(FALL(J,I,L)*(CRATES(I+6,L)*HARPER(I+6,J))) 
PROFIT(I+6,L)=PROFIT(I+6,L)+REVNUE(J,I+6,L) 






























C FARM PRODUCTION COSTS CALCULATED FOR ALL ACRES PLANTED OF THAT CROP 
C FOLLOWED BY FARMER NET PROFITS FOR ALL ACRES PLANTED OF THAT CROP 
D02571=1,2 
PROD(I,L)=(V AR(I)*TCRT(LL))+(FIX(I)* ACRES(!)) 
PROFIT(I,L)=(PROFIT(I,L)-PROD(I,L)-(V ARCPC(I)*CRATES(I,L))-FC(I,L)) 
UNPC(I,L)=(FC(I,L)/CRATES(I,L) )+ V ARCPC(I) 
257 CONTINUE 
DO 255 1=1,4 
PROD(I+2,L)=(V AR(I +2)*TCRT(I +2,L) )+(FIX(I+2)* ACRES(I +2)) 












C COMPUTE PER ACRE PROFITS BY CLASS WHEN NET PACKING REVENUE 
CARE POOLED BY CROP. NET PACKING REVENEUS ARE FACILITY PRICE 



























109 FORMAT(1x,'PACKING COSTS',a8,2x,75f8.2) 
CLOSE(?) 
C NOW CALCULATE MEAN AND STANDARD DEVIATION OF PROFITS FOR EACH CLASS 
DO 140 1=1,10 








C NOW WRITE FARMER PROFITS,MEANS & STD DEY BY CLASS WHEN 
C REVENUES ARE POOLED BY CROP 
OPEN(5,FILE= 'POOL VAL') 
WRITE(5,220) 
220 FORMAT(1X,'ACRE FARMER PROFITS W/CROP REVENUE AND COST POOLS') 




221 FORMAT(1X, 'FARMER CLASS' ,I2,75Fl0.1,2X, 'MEAN PROFIT' ,2X,F8.2, 
1 2X,' STANDARD DEVIATION OF PROFITS' ,2X,F8.2) 
C NOW CALCULATE FARMER PROFITS BY CLASS WHEN NET PACKING REVENUES 
C ARE POOLED BY SPRING, SUMMER AND FALL SEASONS 
DO 223 1=1,10 























































C NOW CALCULATE MEAN AND STANDARD DEVIATION OF PROFITS FOR EACH CLASS 
DO 144 1=1,10 






STDEV (I)=((SUMSQ(I)-(NIT*(MEAN(I)**2)) )/(NIT -1) )** .5 
144 CONTINUE 
C NOW WRITE FARMER PROFITS,MEANS & STD DEY BY CLASS WHEN 
C REVENUES ARE POOLED BY SEASON 
WRITE(5,226) 
226 FORMAT(1X,'ACRE FARMER PROFITS: SEASONAL REVENUE & COST POOLS') 
DO 228 1=1,10 
WRITE(5,227) I,(CLASS(I,L),L=1,NIT),MEAN(I),STDEV(I) 
228 CONTINUE 
227 FORMAT(1X,'FARMER CLASS',I2,75F10.1,2X,'MEAN PROFIT',2X,F8.2, 









C TIDS PROGRAM IS BASED ON CODE WRITTEN BY SPENCE TO 
C COFACTOR VARIANCE COY ARIANCE MATRICES. 
C INPUT INFORMATION: 
C M, THE SIZE OF THE INPUT MATRIX 
C SIG(M,M)=THE INPUT MATRIX UPPER TRIANGLE 
C OUTPUT INFORMATION: 
C SIG(M,M)=THE INPUT MATRIX FOR VERIFICATION 
C A(M,M)=THE UPPER TRIANGLE 




















ELSE IF(K;EQ.8) THEN 
M=6 
write(* ,300) ((sig(i,j,k)j=1,m),i=1,m) 
ELSE IF(K.EQ.7) THEN 
M=9 
write(* ,345) ((sig(i,j,k)j=l.m),i=1,m) 
ELSE IF(K.EQ.6) THEN 
M=12 
write(* ,346) ((sig(i,j,k),j=1,m),i=1,m) 
ELSE IF(K.EQ.5) THEN 
M=11 
write(*,347) ((sig(i,j,k),j=1,m),i=1,m) 
ELSE IF(K.EQ.4) THEN 
M=12 
write(*,348) ((sig(i,j,k)j=1,m),i=1,m) 
ELSE IF(K.EQ.3) THEN 
M=17 
write(* ,349) ((sig(i,j,k),j= 1,m),i=1,m) 




















DO 50 1=1,1STOP 
A(I,M)=SIG(I,M,K)/ A(M,M) 
50 CONTINUE 






























DO 150 L=ICOLPl,M 
SUM=SUM +A(IROW,L)* A(ICOL,L) 
150 CONTINUE 
























ELSE IF(K.EQ.8) THEN 
M=6 
write(5,300) ((a(i,j)j=1,m),i=1,m) 
ELSE IF(K.EQ.7) THEN 
M=9 
write(5,345) ((a(ij)j=1,m),i=1,m) 
ELSE IF(K.EQ.6) THEN 
M=12 
write(5,346) ((a(ij)j=1,m),i=1,m) 
ELSE IF(K.EQ.5) THEN 
M=ll 
write(5,347) ((a(i,j),j=1,m),i=1,m) 
ELSE IF(K.EQ.4) THEN 
M=12 
write(5,348) ((a(ij),j=1,m),i=1,m) 
ELSE IF(K.EQ.3) THEN 
M=17 
write(5,349) ((a(i,j)j=1,m),i=1,m) 





















250 FORMAT(2X, 'THE UPPER AND LOWER TRIANGLE MATRICS,CROP: ',12) 
401 FORMAT(2X, 'YOUR INPUT MATRIX') 
650 FORMAT(2X, 'MULTIPLYING THE FIRST ROW OF "A" BY THE FIRST 
1 COLUMN OF "APRIME" YIELDS',F10.5//' THIS SHOULD BE THE SAME 
2 AS ELEMENT (1,1) OF YOUR INPUT MATRIX' II' CHECK TO SEE ') 
900 FORMAT(' SIG AND SUM:' ,2F12.7,215) 
901 FORMAT(' IN LOOP SUM' ,F12.7) 
902 FORMAT(' DIAGNOSTICS ON THE CALCULATION OF THE DIAGONAL 
1 ELEMENTS. 1'/' IF "SUM" EXCEEDS "SIG", THE PROGRAM ABORTS. 'I' 
2 IT HAS ATTEMPTED TOT AKE SQUARE ROOT OF NEGATIVE NUMBER.') 
903 FORMAT(2x,'TERMINATION REACHED') 
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904 FORMAT(2x,'PREMATURE TERMINATION REACHED WHEN CALCULATING 
1 ELEMENT' ,13,' ,' ,13) 
GOTO 106 
100 WRITE(6,105) 







DEFINITIONS OF VARIABLES USED 
IN COMPUTER PROGRAM 
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AVERAGE COST OF PACKING PER CROP 
NUMBER OF ACRES PLANTED FOR EACH CROP 
CROP BY ITERATION MATRIX OF TOTAL CRATES 
HARVESTED 
CROP BY ITERATION MATRIX OF TOTAL COSTS OF 
SPACKING 
WEEK BY CROP BY ITERATION MATRIX OF PRICES 
PAID TO PACKING FACILITY FOR SUMMER CROPS 
WEEK BY CROP BY ITERATION MATRIX OF PRICES 
PAID TO PACKING FACILITY FOR FALL CROPS 
WEEK BY CROP BY ITERATION MATRIX OF PRICES 
PAID TO PACKING FACILITY FOR SPRING CROPS 
WEEK BY CROP BY ITERATION MATRIX OF PRICES 
PAID TO PRODUCERS FOR SUMMER CROPS 
WEEK BY CROP BY ITERATION MATRIX OF PRICES 
PAID TO PRODUCERS FOR FALL CROPS 
WEEK BY CROP BY ITERATION MATRIX OF PRICES 
PAID TO PRODUCERS OF SPRING CROPS 
CROP BY ITERATION MATRIX OF NUMBER OF CRATES 
PACKED 
CROP BY WEEK MATRIX OF WEEKLY PERCENTAGES OF 
CROP HARVESTED 
TOTAL FIXED PACKING COSTS FOR ALL CRATES 
PACKED OF A PARTICULAR CROP BY ITERATION 
UNIT OR PER CRATE VARIABLE COST OF PACKING BY 
CROP 
DETERMINES HOW COSTS ARE ALLOCATED. A 
POSITIVE VALUE FOR ALLOC: TONNAGE BASIS; 
NEGATIVE VALUE FOR ALLOC: CRATES BASIS; 
A VALUE OF 0 FOR ALLOC: HOURS OF OPERATION 
AND VALUE OF NET PACKING REVENUES ARE BOTH 
USED FOR BASIS OF ALLOCATION 
SUBROUTINE ASSIGN(CPC,P,AME,ARPER,AVGPC,CRATES,ACRES,TCRT) 
FILE=ASSIGN.FOR 
I #NUMBER OF CROPS 
J#ofWeeks 
M#of Assets 
L # of Iterations 
p packed crates 
p/r packed and rejected crates 




































PERCENTAGE OF DELIVERY TO FACILITY THAT IS 
PACKED 
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#WORKERS PER HOUR HANDLING PACKED/REJECTED 
CRATES 
#WORKERS PER HOUR HANDLING REJECTED CRATES 
ONLY 
#WORKERS PER HOUR HANDLING PACKED CRATES 
ONLY 
PERCENTAGE CAP A CITY OF PLANT OPERATION 
#CRATES PER HOUR MAXIMUM THAT CAN BE PACKED 
YIELD MAXIMUM 
YIELD MINIMUM 
YIELD MODAL VALUE 
DIRECT PACKING MATERIAL COSTS PER CRATE 
#ACRES PLANTED 
TOTAL ACRES PLANTED FOR ALL CROPS 
PER CRATE WEIGHT IN POUNDS 
AN ARRAY OF l'S AND O'S ASSIGNING SPECIALTY 
ASSETS TO CROPS. l=CROP USED MACHINE, 
O=DID NOT USE IT 
TOTAL# LABORERS FOR R,P/R,P CRATES 
ACTUAL#OFCRATESPACKEDPERHOUR 
PER CRATE LABOR COST OF HANDLING P/R CRATES 
PER CRATE LABOR COST OF HANDLING P CRATES 
PER CRATE LABOR COST OF HANDLING R CRATES 
YIELDS GENERA TED FOR EACH CROP 
CROP BY ITERATION MATRIX OF YIELDS GENERA TED 
NUMBER OF CROPS 
#OF PACKED CRATES 
#OF PACKED CRATES FOR EACH ITERATION 
TOTAL# CRATES DELIVERED TO PACKING FACILITY 
TOTAL# CRATES DELIVERED TO FACILITY EACH 
ITERATION 
TOTAL# PACKED CRATES ALL CROPS 
#OF REJECTED CRATES 
TOTAL TONS PACKED 
TOTAL TONS PACKED INCLUDING ALL CROPS 
TOTAL LABOR COSTS OF HANDLING P/R CRATES 
TOTAL LABOR COSTS OF HANDLING 
PCRATES 


















TOTAL LABOR COST OF HANDLING ALL CRATES BY 
CROP 
TOTAL DIRECT MATERIALS COST BY CROP 
TOTAL VARIABLE COSTS FOR EACH CRATE 
(MATERIALS +LABOR) 
VARIABLE COSTS PER PACKED CRATE BY CROP 
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CROP BY HARVEST WEEK MATRIX OF PACKING HOURS 
WEEKLY HOURS OF PACKING SUMMED ACROSS WEEKS 
FOR EACH CROP 
PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL PACKING HOUSE HOURS FOR 
EACH CROP 
STANDARD LINE AND OVERHEAD COSTS ALLOC. TO 
CROPS 
SPECIALTY LINE COSTS SUMMED FOR EACH CROP 
SUM OF STD AND SPEC COSTS FOR EACH CROP 
FIXED COSTS PER CRATE FOR EACH CROP 
TOTAL (V AR+FIX) COSTS PER CRATE FOR EACH CROP 
CROP BY ITERATION MATRIX OF TOTAL UNIT 
PACKING COSTS 
SUM OF PACKING COSTS ACROSS ALLITERATIONS 
AVERAGE PACKING COST BY CROP 
CROP BY WEEK MATRIX OF HARVEST PERCENTAGES 
VERIFIES !FALL %'S ADD TO 1 FOR EACH CROP 

















HOURLY WAGE PAID PACKING FACILITY LABORERS 
EFFECTIVE WAGE OR LABOR COST PER HOUR 
INCLUDING TAXES 
FEDERAL UNEMPLOYMENT TAX RATE 
STATE UNEMPLOYMENT TAX RATE 
SOCIAL SECURITY TAX RATE 
NAME OF ASSET 
LIFE OF ASSET 
NUMBER OF YEARS ASSET IS OWNED 
INITIAL VALUE OF ASSET 
SALVAGE VALUE OF ASSET 
ANNUAL EXPENSES (UTIL,PH,FUEL,SUPPLIES,PROMO) 
ANNUAL ADMINISTRATIVE SALARIES 
BUILDING MAINTENANCE AND INSURANCE 
OFFICE SUPPLIES 
UTILmES AND MACHINE MAINTENANCE 

















FOR EACH SPECIALTY ASSETS, OTHER COSTS 
BESIDES DEPRECIATION. 
AN ARRAY OF l'S AND O'S DISTINGUISHING 
STANDARD FROM SPECIALTY ASSETS. l=STD, 
O=SPEC 
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TOTAL PACKING HOURS FOR ENTIRE PACKING FACIL-
=1 IF COSTS ARE ALLOC BY TONNAGE, =0 IF BY HOURS 
DEPRECIATION CALCULATED FOR EACH ASSET 
TOTAL OF DEPRECIATION FOR ALL STANDARD 
ASSETS 
SUM OF DEPRECIATION AND OTHER SPECIALTY 
COSTS BY ASSET 
ASSET BY CROP MATRIX OF VOLUME OF CROP 
HANDLED 
VOLUME OF CROP HANDLED SUMMED FOR EACH ASSET 
ASSET BY CROP MATRIX OF %'s OF SPEC ASSET 
COSTS 
ASSET BY CROP MATRIX OF TOTAL COSTS OF 
SPECIALTY ASSETS 
NUMBER OF ITERATIONS 
NUMBER OF ASSETS 
NUMBER OF WEEKS 
SEED VALUE USED IN GENERATION OF STOCHASTIC 
YIELDS, PASSED IN FROM MAIN PROGRAM AND 
PASSED ON TO STOCH SUBROUTINE 









THE UPPER TRIANGULAR "A" MATRIX, FACTORED 
OUTSIDE OF PROGRAM 
THE MATRIX THAT RECEIVES AND RETAINS THE 
NORMAL DEVIATES. 
CONTAINS THE PRODUCE OF THE A AND X MATRICES. 
THE MATRIX OF ERROR TERMS RETURNED TO 
SUBROUTINE SEASPR. 
UNIFORM RANDOM DEVIATES 
NORMAL RANDOM DEVIATE 
SEED VALUE FOR GENERATION OF UNIFORM DEVIATES 


















NUMBER OF ITERATIONS 
NUMBER OF WEEKS 
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CONTAINS THE SUM OF EACH COLUMN OF OUTCOMES 
CONTAINS THE CALCULATED MEAN PRICES FOR EACH 
CROP FOR ALLITERATIONS 
WEEK BY CROP MATRIX OF MEAN PRICES 
NUMBER OF OUTCOMES GENERA TED BY CORRELATION 
PROGRAM (NUMBER OF ITERATIONS). 
NUMBER OF ITERATIONS 
CROP BY ITERATION MATRIX OF OUTCOMES 
CORRECTEDFOR THE MEAN. 
STORES THE SQUARE OF EACH OUTCOME CORRECTED 
FOR THE MEAN. 
CONTAINS THE SUM OF SQUARES FOR EACH EVENT 
AFTER CORRECTION FOR THE MEAN. 
CONTAINS UNBIASED ESTIMATE OF THE VARIANCE 
OF EACH EVENT. 
CONTAINS THE STANDARD DEVIATION OF THE OUT 
COMES OF EACH EVENT. 
WEEK BY CROP MATRIX OF STANDARD DEVIATIONS 
THESE ARRAYS CONTAIN THE VALVES RESULTING 
WEEK BY CROP BY ITERATION MATRIX OF PRICES 
GENERA TED IN SEASPR AND TRANSFERRED INTO 
SUBROUTINE COR FOR VERIFICATION (SUMMER, 
FALL, AND SPRING SEASONS) 
NAMES OF CROPS IN A PARTICULAR SEASON. 
SUBROUTINE SEASPR(SPRING,SUMR,FALL,FARSPR,FARSUM,FARFAL, 






F ARSUM(J ,I,L) 
FARF AL(J,I,L) 
FARSPR(J,I,L) 
SUMMER PACKING FACILITY PRICES 
FALL PACKING FACILITY PRICES 
SPRING PACKING FACILITY PRICES 
MATRIX OF PACKING FACILITY PRICES TRANSFERRED 
TO COR SUBROUTINE 
AVERAGE PACKING COSTS 
PRODUCER SUMMER PRICES (AFTER PACKING COSTS 
ARE SUBTRACTED) 
PRODUCER FALL PRICES (AFTER PACKING COSTS 
ARE SUBTRACTED) 






























F ARSP(J ,I,L) 
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FACTORED VARIANCE-COY ARIANCE MATRICES READ 
SEASPR SUBROUTINE AND TRANSFERRED INTO 
PRICES 
SUBROUTINE TO GENERATE ERROR TERMS FOR PRICE 
EQUATIONS. THERE IS ONE VARIANCE-COVARIANCE 
MATRIX FOR EACH OF THE NINE CROPS. THE 
DIMENSIONS OF EACH MATRIX IS DETERMINED BY THE 
NUMBER OF WEEKS EACH CROP IS HARVESTED. 
VECTORS OF ERROR TERMS GENERA TED IN 
SUBROUTINE PRICES AND TRANSFERRED INTO 
SUBROUTINE SEASPR TO GENERATE PRICE 
EQUATIONS. A NEW SET OF ERROR TERMS IS 
GENERA TED EACH ITERATION FOR EACH OF THE 
WEEKS EACH CROP IS HARVESTED. 
NUMBER OF CROPS 
NUMBER OF WEEKS, SUMMER 
NUMBER OF ITERATIONS 
NUMBER OF SPRING CROPS 
NAMES OF SUMMER CROPS 
NAMES OF FALL CROPS 
NAMES OF SPRING CROPS 
NAMES OF ALL NINE CROPS 
MEANS OF PRICE EQUATIONS READ IN FROM FILE 
MEAN 
PRODUCER SUMMER PRICES BEFORE PACKING COSTS 
ARE SUBTRACTED 
FALL PRODUCER PRICES BEFORE PACKING COSTS 
ARE SUBTRACTED 
SPRING PRODUCER PRICES BEFORE PACKING COSTS 
ARE SUBTRACTED 




WEEK X CROP X ITERATION MATRIX OF SPRING 
PRICES RECENED BY PACKING FACILITY 
CROP X WEEK X ITERATION MATRIX OF SUMMER 































CROP X WEEK X ITERATION MATRIX OF FALL PRICES 
RECENED BY PACKING FACILITY 
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PER CRATE SPRING PRICES RECENED BY PRODUCERS 
PER CRATE SUMMER PRICES RECEIVED BY 
PRODUCERS 
PER CRATE FALL PRICES RECENED BY PRODUCERS 
NAMES OF CROPS 
CROP X ITERATION MATRIX OF TOTAL PACKING 
COSTS PER CRATE 
CROP BY WEEK MATRIX OF% HARVESTED EACH WEEK 
TOTAL ACRES PLANTED FOR EACH CLASS OF 
PRODUCER. THERE ARE 10 CLASSES. 
WEEK BY CROP BY ITERATION MATRIX OF NET 
PACKING REVENUES ON PER CRATE BASIS 
TOTAL ACRES PLANTED 
TOTAL CRATES HARVESTED AND DELNERED TO PACK 
ING FACILITY BY ITERATION 
TOTAL CRATES PACKED AND SOLD BY ITERATION 
PER ACRE FARM LEVEL FIXED COST OF PRODUCTION 
PER CRATE FARM LEVEL VARIABLE COST OF 
PRODUCTION 
TOTAL NET PACKING REVENUES FOR ALL CRATES 
PACKED 
FALL POOL OF NET PACKING REVENUES 
SUMMER POOL OF NET PACKING REVENUES 
SPRING POOL OF NET PACKING REVENUES 
TOTAL PRODUCER REVENUES FOR ALL CRATES 
PACKED IN SPRING BY WEEK, CROP AND ITERATION 
TOTALPRODUCERREVENUESFORALLCRATES 
PACKED IN SUMMER BY WEEK, CROP AND ITERATION 
TOTAL PRODUCER REVENUES FOR ALL CRATES 
PACKED IN FALL BY WEEK, CROP AND ITERATION 
FARSP SUMMED OVER THE WEEKS 
FARS SUMMED OVER THE WEEKS 
FARF SUMMED OVER THE WEEKS 
CROP BY ITERATION MATRIX OF TOTAL COSTS OF 
FARM LEVEL PRODUCTION AND HARVESTING FOR 
ALL ACRES HARVESTED 
PERCENTAGE OF CRATES EACH CLASS OF PRODUCER 
GROWS BY CLASS AND CROP 
NUMBER OF WEEKS IN FALL SEASON 
NUMBER OF WEEKS IN SUMMER SEASON 
NUMBER OF WEEKS IN SPRING SEASON 












NET PACKING REVENUES MINUS TOTAL FARM LEVEL 
COSTS OF PRODUCTION FOR ALL ACRES PLANTED 
OF EACH CROP 
PER ACRE PRODUCER PROFITS BY CLASS OF 
PRODUCER FOR DIFFERENT POOLING METHODS 
SPRING POOL OF PRODUCER PAYMENTS FOR ALL 
CRATES SOLD IN THE SPRING 
SUMMER POOL OF PRODUCER PAYMENTS FOR ALL 
CRATES SOLD IN THE SUMMER 
FALL POOL OF PRODUCER PAYMENTS FOR ALL 
CRATES SOLD IN THE FALL 
CLASS(I,L) SQUARED. (CLASS IS PRODUCER RETURNS 
PER ACRE) 
SUM OF THE PER ACRE FARMER RETURNS SQUARED 
SUM OF CLASS(l,L), SUMMED OVER THE ITERATIONS 
FOR EACH CLASS 
MEAN OF THE PER ACRE FARMER RETURNS OVER 
ALLITERATIONS BY CLASS 
STANDARD DEVIATION OF PER ACRE FARMER 
RETURNS OVER ALLITERATIONS BY CLASS 
SUBROUTINE VALCOS (SPRING, SUMMER, FALL, FARSPR, FARSUM, FARFAL, 










F ARF AL(J ,I,L) 
WEEK BY CROP BY ITERATION MATRIX OF PER CRATE 
SPRING PRICES RECEIVED BY PACKING FACILITY 
CROP BY WEEK BY ITERATION MATRIX OF PER 
CRATE SUMMER PRICES RECEIVED BY PACKING 
FACILITY 
WEEK BY CROP BY ITERATION MATRIX OF PER CRATE 
FALL PRICES RECEIVED BY PACKING FACILITY 
PER CRATE PRODUCER SPRING PRICES BY WEEK, 
CROP AND ITERATION 
PER CRATE PRODUCER SUMMER PRICES BY WEEK, 
CROP AND ITERATION 
PER CRATE PRODUCER FALL PRICES BY WEEK, CROP 
AND ITERATION 
WEEK BY CROP BY ITERATION MATRIX OF SPRING 
PRODUCER GROSS REVENUES 
WEEK BY CROP BY ITERATION MATRIX OF SUMMER 
PRODUCER GROSS REVENUES 





















PRODUCER GROSS REVENUES 
FARSPR SUMMED OVER THE WEEKS 
FARSUM SUMMED OVER THE WEEKS 
FARFAL SUMMED OVER THE WEEKS 
SPRING POOL OF PRODUCER GROSS REVENUES FOR 
ALL CRATES SOLD IN THE SPRING 
SUMMER POOL OF PRODUCER GROSS REVENUES FOR 
ALL CRATES SOLD IN THE SUMMER 
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FALL POOL OF PRODUCER GROSS REVENUES FOR ALL 
CRATES SOLD IN THE FALL 
TOTAL GROSS PACKING REVENUES FOR ALL CRATES 
PACKED 
CROP BY ITERATION MATRIX OF SUMMER PACKING 
FACILITY GROSS REVENUES MINUS TOTAL VARIABLE 
COSTS OF PACKING 
CROP BY ITERATION MATRIX OF SPRING GROSS 
PACKING FACILITY REVENUES MINUS TOTAL VARI 
ABLE COSTS OF PACKING 
CROP BY ITERATION MATRIX OF FALL GROSS 
PACKING FACILITY REVENUES MINUS TOTAL VARI 
ABLE COSTS OF PACKING 
POOLSS SUMMED OVER ALL CROPS 
POOLPP SUMMED OVER ALL CROPS 
POOLFF SUMMED OVER ALL CROPS 
TOTAL GROSS PACKING REVENUES FOR ALL CROPS 
BY ITERATION 
FALL POOL OF NET PACKING REVENUES. FALL POOL'S 
SHARE OF FIXED PACKING COSTS MEASURED AS A 
PERCENTAGE OF GROSS PACKING REVENUES 
SUMMER POOL OF NET PACKING REVENUES. SUMMER 
POOL'S SHARE OF FIXED PACKING COSTS MEASURED 
AS A PERCENTAGE OF GROSS PACKING REVENUES 
SPRING POOL OF NET PACKING REVENUES. SPRING 
POOL SHARE OF GROSS PACKING FIXED PACKING 
COSTS MEASURED AS A PERCENT AGE OF GROSS 
PACKING REVENUES OF SPRING 
NET PACKING REVENUES, NET OF PACKING AND 
FARM LEVEL COSTS OF PRODUCTION FOR ALL ACRES 
PLANTED OF EACH CROP 
PER ACRE PRODUCER PROFITS BY CLASS OF 
PRODUCER FOR DIFFERENT POOLING METHODS 
CROP BY ITERATION MATRIX OF TOTAL COSTS 
OF FARM LEVEL PRODUCTION AND HARVESTING 























CROP BY ITERATION MATRIX OF TOTAL FIXED 
COSTS OF PACKING 
TOTFIX SUMMED OvER ALL CROPS TO ELIMINATE 
ALLOCATION METHOD FROM SUBROUTINE ASSIGN 
CROP BY ITERATION MATRIX OF TOTAL 
FIXED COSTS OF PACKING WITH FIXED COSTS 
ALLOCATED TO CROPS BASED ON EACH CROP'S 
CONTRIBUTION TO GROSS PACKING REVENUES 
PERCENTAGE OF CRATES EACH CLASS OF 
PRODUCER GROWS BY CLASS AND CROP 
NUMBER OF WEEKS IN FALL SEASON 
NUMBER OF WEEKS IN SUMMER SEASON 
NUMBER OF WEEKS IN SPRING SEASON 
NUMBER OF CROPS 
NAMES OF CROPS 
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CROP BY WEEK MATRIX OF% HARVESTED EACH WEEK 
TOTAL ACRES PLANTED FOR EACH CLASS OF 
PRODUCER. THERE ARE 10 CLASSES. 
TOTAL ACRES PLANTED BY CROP 
TOTAL CRATES HARVESTED AND DELIVERED TO 
PACKING FACILITY BY ITERATION 
TOTAL CRATES PACKED AND SOLD BY ITERATION 
PER ACRE FARM LEVEL FIXED COST OF PRODUCTION 
PER CRATE FARM LEVEL VARIABLE COST OF 
PRODUCTION 
CLASS(I,L) SQUARED. (CLASS IS FARMER RETURNS PER 
SUM OF THE PER ACRE FARMER RETURNS SQUARED 
SUM OF CLASS(I,L), SUMMED OVER THE ITERATIONS 
FOR EACH CLASS 
MEAN OF THE PER ACRE NET FARMER PROFITS OVER 
ALLITERATIONS BY CLASS 
STANDARD DEVIATION OF PER ACRE NET FARMER 
PROFITS OVER ALLITERATIONS BY CLASS 
APPENDIXG 
DATA INPUT AND OUTPUT FILES 
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DATA INPUT Fll..ES 
CALLING 
SUBROUTINE Fll..ENAME VARIABLES 
MAIN PROGRAM PRGl ALLOC 
ASSIGN OPTIONS ALLOC 
ASSIGN HARVEST I,PER 
ASSIGN COST ASSET, INIT, SALV, LIFE, SID, 
OTHER(M),M=1,14 
COSTAR(M,n,M=l,l4,1=1,9 
NAME(n, CAPAC(!), P AKOUT(I), 
PERPACK(n, ACRES(!), DMPCC(n, 
LABPR(n, LABP(n, LABR(n, 
POUNDS(n,I=1,9 
YMAX(I),YMIN(I),YMODE(I),I=l,9 









SEASPR MEAN MEANS(n,l=l,23 
REFUND PROD FIX(I),VAR(I),I=l,9 
CLACRE(I),I=l,lO 
PCRT(I,J),I=l,lO,J=l,9 
SPENSE FACTOR SIG(I,J,K),I=l,l7, J=1,17,K=1,9 
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DATA OUPUT FILES. 
CALLING 
SUBROUTINE FILE VARIABLES 
COR MEANS NAME(I),I=l,NCROP 
MEANPR(L,I),STDEV(L,I), 
I=l,9,L=l,NWKS 
VALCOS POOL VAL CLASS(I,L),I=l,lO, L=1,75 
MEAN(I),STDEV(I),I=l,lO 
VALCOS UNPCOS UNPC(I,L),I=l,9,L=l,75 
POOL POOLAS CLASS(I,L),I=l,lO L=l,75 
MEAN(I),STDEV(I),I=l, 10 
ASSIGN PACKING A VGPC(I),I=1,9 
AME(I),I=1,9 
CPC(I,L),I=1,9,L=l,75 
ASSIGN YLD AME(I),I=l,9 
YIELDS(I,L),I=l,9,L=l,75 
SPENSE AMATRIX A(I,J),I=l,M,J=l,M_ 
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